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INTRODUCTION
Sometimes the most practical solutions to digital technology problems are not
digital. Some Russian security officials have returned to using manual typewriters
for sensitive communications because every “form of electronic communication is
vulnerable,” which means, as one official explained, sometimes “the most primitive
method is preferred: a human hand with a pen or a typewriter.”1 In Germany, too,
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1. Miriam Elder, Russian Guard Service Reverts to Typewriters After NSA Leaks,
GUARDIAN (July 11, 2013, 11:42 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11
/russia-reverts-paper-nsa-leaks [https://perma.cc/ZRZ3-J7FU].
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some government employees are being discouraged from using digital technology
for communication, instead encouraged to talk over coffee, lunch, and walks. 2
As evidenced by the 2016 presidential election related hacking of campaign emails, the United States faces serious cybersecurity problems too. Unfortunately,
cybersecurity is very difficult to achieve.3 There are millions of lines of code in each
computer program, each line potentially vulnerable to attack. 4 Attacks are easy, fluid,
and constant.5 Defense requires constant success; attackers need only rare success in
order to do great damage. 6
But it is the human factor that is the greatest difficulty for cybersecurity. 7
Motivated by financial gain, personal grudges, or political ideals, human users are
unavoidable risks, even when those users have limited technical skills. 8 The greatest
loss of top secrets in U.S. history involved an inside user with just a thumb drive and
a security clearance.9 Indeed, it was Edward Snowden’s thumb drive that pushed
Russians to manual typewriters and Germans to long walks. 10 But the risks are
greater than those raised by dissident insiders, as indifference and negligence, such
as the failure to use good passwords or resist curious links, are the more common
and more difficult risks to manage.11
A great deal is risked by inadequate cybersecurity. Identity theft and other
cybercrimes cost victims financially and psychologically. 12 There are also cyberwar
and cyberterrorism.13 Physical infrastructures, like utilities and nuclear reactors, have
been hit through cyberattacks.14 But in this newest age of war and terrorism, information is increasingly becoming the target. In recent “vacuum cleaner” attacks, the
Chinese government vacuumed up personal information on tens of millions of
Americans whose health was insured by Anthem and another four million government employees whose security clearance files were held by the federal Office of

2. Philip Oltermann, Germany ‘May Revert to Typewriters’ To Counter Hi-Tech
Espionage, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2014, 2:04 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014
/jul/15/germany-typewriters-espionage-nsa-spying-surveillance [https://perma.cc/WB2R-P93Z]
(discussing the strategy considered by the German government).
3. Peter J. Denning & Dorothy E. Denning, Cybersecurity Is Harder than Building
Bridges, 104 AM. SCIENTIST 154, 154 (2016).
4. Id. at 156.
5. Id. at 155–56.
6. See id.
7. See infra Part II.D.
8. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-758T, INFORMATION SECURITY:
CYBER THREATS AND DATA BREACHES ILLUSTRATE NEED FOR STRONGER CONTROLS ACROSS
FEDERAL AGENCIES 4 (2015).
9. Chris Strohm & Del Quentin Wilber, Pentagon Says Snowden Took Most U.S. Secrets
Ever: Rogers, BLOOMBERG: TECH. (Jan. 10, 2014, 12:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com
/news/articles/2014-01-10/pentagon-says-snowden-took-most-u-s-secrets-ever-rogers [https://
perma.cc/DWE3-3E9A].
10. See infra notes 285–289 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
12. See infra Parts I.B, III.
13. See infra notes 136–50 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 136–142 and accompanying text.
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Personnel Management (OPM).15 Building a database on individuals in potentially
hostile nations has become a war aim in the digital age. 16 But even more worrisome
for national security experts is the opportunity for hostile actors quietly to take control of U.S. information systems by quietly manipulating the data in those systems.17
According to FBI experts, the IRS information system is the “gold standard” for
cyberattacks in the United States.18 The IRS collects personal information, and, in
some cases, extraordinarily detailed and sensitive information, on about 290 million
individuals each year.19 With a U.S. population of 328 million, that is not information
on everyone, but it is information on closer to everyone than any other single agency
collects.20 The IRS also handles more money than any other agency: $3.3 trillion in
total collections and $403 billion in individual income tax payments.21 Taking advantage of online refund processing, each year cybercriminals steal about $3 billion
from the IRS.22 Last year they also stole detailed personal information on about
724,000 individual taxpayers.23
But there are greater risks. Even more would have been lost if the IRS database
were the target of a vacuum cleaner attack like Anthem and the OPM. Or if IRS
information were quietly manipulated to push payments into criminals’ accounts or
push taxpayers and tax administrators into confusion. Or if the information were
simply deleted, destroying all record of payments and filings and dropping the government, taxpayers, and the economy into costly chaos.
Unfortunately, there is no reason to believe the IRS will develop adequate
cybersecurity. While history is not determinative, it is revealing. And while the IRS
has achieved some significant information technology successes, its history is
marked more by significant failures. 24 The IRS computing system remains largely
dependent on the magnetic tape drives housed in the Martinsburg, West Virginia,

15. Ellen Nakashima, With a Series of Major Hacks, China Builds a Database on
Americans, WASH. POST (June 5, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/nationalsecurity/in-a-series-of-hacks-china-appears-to-building-a-database-on-americans/2015/06/05
/d2af51fa-0ba3-11e5-95fd-d580f1c5d44e_story.html [https://perma.cc/V8XP-68LK].
16. See id.
17. Spencer Ackerman, Newest Cyber Threat Will Be Data Manipulation, U.S.
Intelligence Chief Says, GUARDIAN (Sept. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com
/technology/2015/sep/10/cyber-threat-data-manipulation-us-intelligence-chief [https://perma
.cc/YTG8-YVXV].
18. Krysia Lenzo, Ex-FBI Official: IRS Is a Favorite Target, CNBC (Feb. 10, 2016),
http://www.cnbc.com/2016/02/10/ex-fbi-official-irs-is-a-favorite-hacking-target.html [https://
perma.cc/92L8-G3SP].
19. JUSTIN BRYAN, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, 2011 (2013) http://www.irs.gov
/pub/irs-soi/13inreturnsfallbul.pdf [https://perma.cc/6KT8-NCCG].
20. U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov
/popclock.
21. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 3 tbl.1 (2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irssoi/15databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/3NUD-BH63].
22. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-508, IDENTITY THEFT AND TAX FRAUD
1–2 (2016).
23. Id. at 6.
24. See infra Part II.A.
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computer center established in 1961.25 After decades of work and billions of dollars,
the IRS has failed to establish a state-of-the-art computer system, or even a searchable database of all taxpayer information.26 Indeed, after four years of work and $139
million dollars, the IRS has failed even to upgrade from Windows 2003 to Windows
XP.27
The IRS now spends $2.4 billion each year on computer technology, but that is
spread among nineteen different projects, of which updating its system is only one. 28
Given the billions spent already, there is no reason to believe adequate technology at
the IRS is merely a matter of funding. All the same, Congress has been reducing
funding at the IRS for years, and probably will continue to do so. 29 It would require
a substantial increase in IRS funding to return it to past levels, which makes it even
less likely the IRS will achieve adequate cybersecurity. 30
But cybersecurity is difficult for even well-funded organizations to achieve. 31
There is a shortage of cybersecurity experts, and the IRS has to compete with Google
and the Pentagon for them.32 Making the problem worse, the complexity of the IRS
computing system exceeds that of most outside organizations.33 The IRS computing
system involves hundreds of millions of users, billions in payments to hundreds of
millions of taxpayers, trillions in collections from hundreds of millions of taxpayers,
and notoriously complex laws, regulations, and processes.34 Doubting the IRS’s ability to secure its system does not mean doubting the effort or intelligence of IRS employees. It only means taking seriously the difficulties faced by these employees and
taking seriously the history of technology failures that have occurred despite the decades of hard work by those employees and the billions of dollars spent by their managers.
Given that the IRS is the gold standard for cyberattack but yet cannot manage to
upgrade its Windows systems, one may wonder why the worst sorts of attacks have
yet to hit the IRS. Ironically, it may be the decades of failures that have protected the
IRS from cutting-edge technological attacks.35 While not like manual typewriters,
the antiquated system of the IRS, which until very recently depended entirely on
weekly uploads to magnetic tapes, is not at all like the updated systems at Anthem

25. See infra notes 183–187 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 192–209 and accompanying text.
27. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2015-20-073, INADEQUATE EARLY
OVERSIGHT LED TO WINDOWS UPGRADE PROJECT DELAYS 2 (2015), https://www.treasury.gov
/tigta/auditreports/2015reports/201520073fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z3DB-GC92].
28. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-297, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY:
MANAGEMENT NEEDS TO ADDRESS REPORTING OF IRS INVESTMENTS COST, SCHEDULE, AND
SCOPE INFORMATION 1–4 (2015).
29. See infra Part II.B.
30. See infra Part II.B.
31. See infra Part II.E.
32. See infra Part II.C.
33. See James R. Thompson, Fixing the IRS, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Apr. 1, 2012), http://
www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2012/04/fixing-irs/41637 [https://perma.cc/MW2NMGK5].
34. See infra notes 280–283 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 290–294.
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and the OPM that the Chinese government vacuumed.36 While this technological arrest has been unintentional, unlike the intentional Russian and German government
strategies, it appears to have been effective. What has been successfully attacked at
the IRS are not these older systems, which are open only to IRS users, but the newer,
public-facing systems that provide outside users greater convenience in getting refunds or information. 37
However, like all other institutions, the IRS is interested in increasing user convenience and institutional efficiency through greater use of information technology,
not less.38 There is long-standing pressure on the IRS to reduce the gap between taxes
owed and taxes paid and to reduce the burden of those filing returns and paying
taxes.39 President Barack Obama said that IRS technology should make filing returns
and paying taxes as easy as ordering pizza online. 40 And the IRS itself has articulated
a Future State initiative in which almost all taxpayer experiences are mediated
through information technology. 41
The political appeal of making taxpaying more like pizza ordering, the political
necessity of more effective and more efficient tax collection, and popular delight
with all things new and digital means that the IRS will not regress technologically.
The IRS is not about to order typewriters. This is obviously true. But so is the IRS’s
inability to achieve cybersecurity. At risk are cash payments to be stolen, in large
part by international crime syndicates. At risk are personal identities and information
to be stolen, in large part by the same criminal actors. And at risk are the revenue,
economic, and political consequences of information being vacuumed, changed, or
destroyed by political activists, terrorists, or government actors.
This Article takes seriously the cybersecurity challenges faced by the IRS as well
as the agency’s limitations in solving those challenges through its technological advances. The Article argues that we ought not to depend wholly on changes in technology but must change the way we think about cybersecurity. This Article argues
the government ought not to leave cybersecurity as an information technology problem for the IRS to solve but ought to come to it as a legal problem for Congress to
solve.42 Congress has designed a tax system that requires the IRS to collect information on hundreds of millions of individuals and to routinely issue hundreds of
billions in refunds.43 If the tax law did not require so much information on so many,
nor involve refunds to so many, the IRS would be a less appealing and more defensible cyberattack target.44 In short, if the tax law were simpler in specific ways, the

36. See Nakashima, supra note 15.
37. See infra notes 292–293 and accompanying text.
38. Michael Hatfield, Taxation and Surveillance: An Agenda, 17 YALE J.L. & TECH. 319,
322–23, 339–40 (2015).
39. See infra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.
40. Issie Lapowsky, Filing Taxes Should Be as Easy as Ordering Pizza, Obama Says,
WIRED (Oct. 12, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/obama-filing-taxes-easy-orderingpizza [https://perma.cc/7UD6-HYM4].
41. See infra notes 66–71.
42. See infra Part III.B.
43. See infra Part III.B.
44. See infra conclusion of Part III.B.
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information technology needs at the IRS would be simpler, and adequate
cybersecurity for the IRS would be easier.45
There are many ways to define and collect tax liabilities.46 Tax law is a matter of
politics, not science. Perhaps much to the sadness of those who wish it were a science, tax law is determined by political compromises and best guesses. The tax law
need not demand so much information on so many individuals, nor must its administration turn on a system that generates refunds as a rule rather than an exception. 47
Within the limits of the political and financial realities that determine legislation,
there is ample flexibility for Congress to reform tax law so that it demands less of
both taxpayers and tax administrators and, thereby, provides more information security.48 There are a great number of long-familiar tax reform proposals each with a
unique balance of advantages and disadvantages. This Article argues that when considering these reforms, Congress should begin to weigh the impact of cybersecurity
on the scales along with other traditional concerns.49 Of course, cybersecurity should
not be the heaviest of considerations—but it should be a thumb on the scale. Tax
reforms can decrease the treasure trove held by the IRS and increase the likelihood
the IRS can defend it.50
Part I describes cyberattacks at the IRS and elsewhere, predicting future
cyberattacks at the IRS will be similar to previous cyberattacks. Part II begins with
a history of computer use at the IRS, arguing that this history—as well as a variety
of other factors, like inadequate funding and expertise and the technical and human
difficulties of cybersecurity—reveals little reason to be hopeful that the IRS will fail
to achieve appropriate cybersecurity. Part III argues that Congress should consider
how potential tax reforms might make the IRS database a less appealing and a more
defensible cyberattack target. This Article concludes with reflections on the relationship between law reform and the digital revolution.
I. THE PAST AND FUTURE OF THE IRS AS A CYBERATTACK TARGET
The IRS has been the target of cyberattacks, and it will be again. As described in
Part I.A, billions of dollars are stolen each year through the online filing process, and
personal information on 724,000 taxpayers was stolen in 2015 through online access
to taxpayer account information. Part I.B looks to three factors to predict the types
of cyberattacks the future likely holds for the IRS. The first factor is the increasing
use of information technology (IT) at the IRS to collect more personal information.
The second factor is that no other agency will be collecting more information on as
many individuals as the IRS, making the IRS the greatest treasure trove of personal
information in the country. The third factor is the range of cyberattacks and threats
more broadly, which suggests the risks for the IRS include cybercriminals holding

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

See infra conclusion of Part III.B.
See infra notes 297–300.
See infra conclusion of Part III.B.
See infra conclusion of Part III.B.
See infra notes 307, 312, 340, 359, 376, 384–387 and accompanying text.
See infra conclusion of Part III.B.
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IRS information for ransom, and terrorists and hostile governments aiming to damage the U.S. revenue collection system, political stability, and economy by stealing,
changing, or destroying IRS information.
A. IRS as a Cyberattack Target
The IRS was an early adopter of computers, having computerized much of its
operations by the mid-1960s, but it has struggled over the past decades to keep its
systems current with new technology and security. 51 Among its struggles has been
providing a secure system by which the hundreds of millions of individual taxpayers
are able to provide and receive payments and information online.52 In a limited sense,
electronic return filing has been successful, insofar as most individual returns are
now filed electronically.53 However, the IRS is unable to ensure the identity of the
person filing a refund-claiming return.54 To appreciate the scope of this inability, one
has to realize that, while casually one may think of the IRS primarily as receiving
payments, in practice, one of its primary functions is refunding to individuals the
amount by which their withheld tax payments exceeded the amount eventually
shown due on their returns. Each year, the IRS makes refunds to about 119 million
individual taxpayers.55 These refunds total about $403 billion a year.56 Predictably,
this volume of payments lures criminals who file refund-claiming returns online with
stolen personal information. About $26 billion is claimed fraudulently each year this
way.57 The IRS prevents or recovers about $23 billion. 58 But the IRS pays out and is
unable to recover over $3 billion in fraudulent refunds each year. 59 Of course, the
IRS has focused on improving the security of the process. For example, it provides
special identification numbers to improve security. 60 But the IRS has been unable to
secure even these numbers from criminal hackers: in 2016, hackers stole over
100,000 of these special filing numbers. 61
Though the process has tremendous security problems, the IRS has offered online
filing for decades. However, until 2015, the IRS did not offer individual taxpayers
online access to their historic tax information. In January 2015, the IRS launched the
Get Transcript service, enabling taxpayers to view this information (known as a

51. See infra Part II.A.
52. See infra Part II.D.
53. See infra notes 210–220.
54. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 8–9.
55. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 21.
56. Id.
57. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 14.
58. Id.
59. Id.; see also NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 338–
41 (2009); Matt Hunter, Tax-Refund Fraud To Hit $21 Billion, and There’s Little the IRS Can
Do, CNBC (Feb. 11, 2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/02/11/tax-refund-fraud-to-hit-21billion-and-theres-little-the-irs-can-do.html [https://perma.cc/DTQ9-VS4A].
60. Jen Wieczner, Why the IRS’s Technology Nightmare Is Far from Over, FORTUNE
(Mar. 25, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/25/irs-technology-taxes [https://perma.cc/T9PC3DHJ].
61. Id.
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“transcript”) online.62 Unfortunately, the security of the service was so low that,
within the first few months of the service, hackers stole personal information from
about 724,000 taxpayer accounts, and the service had to be cancelled.63 These taxpayer accounts “have so much information that not only can [the cyber criminals]
file false tax returns and get refunds, they can also sell that data on the black market
and make an additional profit,” according to former FBI Assistant Director Chris
Swecker.64 He described taxpayer account information as “the gold standard” and
“the treasure trove of information” cyber criminals are seeking. 65
B. The Future of the IRS as a Cyberattack Target
What types of future cyberattacks on the IRS should be anticipated? In the past,
its failure to secure its online refund-claiming process has cost the government about
$3 billion a year. Its failure to secure taxpayer information online has cost hundreds
of thousands of individuals their personal information—within the first few months
of making that information available online. To get a sense of the future
cybersecurity problems at the IRS, we have first to note the ambitious plans the IRS
has for updating its use of IT. Next, and perhaps most revealing, we need to consider
what types of cybersecurity attacks other agencies have faced.
1. Information Technology
In 2015, the IRS announced its “Future State initiative.” This is the agency’s plan
to “take advantage of the latest technology to enhance the entire taxpayer experience.”66 This plan involves a “web-first” strategy, aiming to provide to taxpayers an
online opportunity for providing and receiving all of their tax relevant information. 67
This would not just be for filing returns and accessing prior returns, but for all communications with the IRS.68 The IRS intends to become more interactive with the
taxpayers through this strategy.69 It expects to increase the speed at which information is gathered, from the taxpayer and third parties, and analyzed to reveal a taxpayer’s potential compliance issues.70 In short, the “future state” the IRS is pursuing

62. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 6; Jada F. Smith, Cyberattack
Exposes I.R.S. Tax Returns, N.Y. TIMES (May 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com
/2015/05/27/business/breach-exposes-irs-tax-returns.html [https://perma.cc/W8RY-S53D];
Written Testimony of Commissioner Koskinen on Unauthorized Attempts To Access Taxpayer
Data Before Senate Finance Committee, IRS (June 2, 2015), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom
/written-testimony-of-commissioner-koskinen-on-unauthorized-attempts-to-access-taxpayerdata-before-senate-finance-committee [https://perma.cc/WJ8X-AJE6].
63. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 6; Smith, supra note 62.
64. Lenzo, supra note 18.
65. Id.
66. Future State Initiative, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/uac/newsroom/future-state-initiative
[https://perma.cc/32JN-CPDJ] (last updated Nov. 9, 2018).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id.
70. Id.
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is one in which more digital information is collected and then analyzed and used
more successfully by the agency.71
This initiative needs to be put into its context. As discussed below, the IRS’s earliest successes at computerization have been followed by decades of high-profile,
expensive failures to update its system. IRS announcements of new high-tech initiatives have become routine, and so have the announcements of newer initiatives to
replace the formerly new initiatives. While this gives good reason to doubt the IRS
will succeed in digitizing all of its operations and interactions with taxpayers, there
is no reason to doubt the IRS will try.
It is obvious why the IRS will try. After all, every other organization in the twentyfirst century is focused on leveraging off the IT revolution. 72 To appreciate the potential usefulness of emerging IT to the IRS, consider the importance of information
to the tax administration. Former IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman described the
IRS as “an information intensive enterprise,” saying that what “really matters” to the
IRS is “the organization of data and ultimately the knowledge and intelligence we
extract from the information.”73 The fact that rapidly emerging information technologies are creating “minutely detailed records” of our lives,74 increasingly facilitating
the “persistent, continuous and indiscriminate monitoring of our daily lives,” 75 the
usefulness of IT is much too great for the IRS to ignore. In our emerging information
age, every “day, rivulets of information [are] sifted, sorted, rearranged, and combined
in hundreds of different ways,” and can be “stream[ed] into electric brains” at the
IRS.76
It is important to appreciate that the IRS is under significant pressure to improve
its information collection and use. There is significant political pressure to close the
significant gap between taxes legally owed and taxes timely collected.77 This is $450

71. The National Taxpayer Advocate 2015 Annual Report has criticized the Future State
initiative on several grounds, including concerns over information security. NAT’L TAXPAYER
ADVOCATE, 2015 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS (2015), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov
/reports/2015-annual-report-to-congress/full-report [https://perma.cc/U7LE-MF2F].
72. Hatfield, supra note 38, at 340.
73. Prepared Remarks of IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman to the Leaders & Legends
Series, Johns Hopkins Carey Business School, Baltimore, IRS (May 18, 2011),
https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/prepared-remarks-of-irs-commissioner-doug-shulman-to-theleaders-legends-series-johns-hopkins-carey-business-school-baltimore [https://perma.cc
/EKU5-S8C7].
74. Hatfield, supra note 38, at 322, 339; Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance,
126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1934 (2013) (arguing increasing surveillance capacity undermines
intellectual privacy and has a coercive element).
75. Danielle Keats Citron & David Gray, Addressing the Harm of Total Surveillance: A
Reply to Professor Neil Richards, 126 HARV. L. REV. F. 262, 274 (2013) (arguing that privacy
harms should be understood in the lens of totalizing surveillance); see also Hatfield, supra
note 38, at 322.
76. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and Metaphors for
Information Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 1394 (2001) (arguing that the privacy harm of
mass surveillance is best understood as a dehumanizing effect of bureaucratic information
gathering); see also Hatfield, supra note 38, at 322, 339.
77. Hatfield, supra note 38, at 337–38; Michael Hatfield, Privacy in Taxation, 44 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 579 (2017); Solove, supra note 76, at 1394; see OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
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billion shortfall is known as the “tax gap.”78 It is, in large part, an information gap:
the difference between what the IRS knows about the taxpayer’s activities and what
the taxpayer and third parties know.79 The pressure to close the tax gap is pressure to
close this information gap, and the usefulness of IT for closing that gap is obvious.80
Politicians, tax administrators, and scholars have focused on this technology, 81 and
in a future in which both government agencies and private companies are pursuing
the “growing gush of data” being generated by an ever-increasing number of internetconnected devices, the role of IT is certain to be expanded.82
A closely related pressure to increase the use of IT is the political pressure to
reduce the compliance burden on taxpayers. This burden is the cost to taxpayers of
attempting to determine and to report their tax liabilities in a timely manner. 83 The
National Taxpayer Advocate estimates tax compliance takes over seven billion hours
of time each year.84 It is so daunting that over eighty percent of individuals pay either
for a professional to prepare their returns or for computerized assistance. 85 The
National Taxpayer Advocate, IRS Commissioners, and politicians have long been
focused on reducing this burden.86 Like the tax gap, the compliance burden is also

FISCAL YEAR 2013 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT 84 (2012), https://www.gpo.gov
/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2013-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2013-BUD.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ND7LWYYZ].
78. Hatfield, supra note 77, at 3.
79. Hatfield, supra note 38, 332, 335–38. On the asymmetric nature of tax information in
tax compliance, see Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps To Reduce the Tax Gap:
When Is Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1735–38 (2010). On
the roles third parties play in tax compliance more generally, see Leandra Lederman, Statutory
Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695 (2007).
80. Hatfield, supra note 38, at 332, 335–38.
81. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 59, at 34; BARACK OBAMA’S
COMPREHENSIVE TAX PLAN (2008), http://web.archive.org/web/20170422040822/http://
halebobb.com/Obama/Factsheet_Tax_Plan_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2KXX-RFD6];
Hatfield, supra note 72, at 338; Hatfield, supra note 77, at 27–28; Jay A. Soled, Call for the
Gradual Phase-Out of All Paper Tax Information Statements, 10 FLA. TAX REV. 345, 363–64
(2010) (calling for third parties to provide information to IRS website that taxpayers could use
prepare returns, reducing burdens on both IRS and taxpayers); Prepared Remarks of IRS
Commissioner Doug Shulman to the Leaders & Legends Series, Johns Hopkins Carey
Business School, Baltimore, supra note 73; Richard Clarke, Richard Clarke on the Future of
Privacy: Only the Rich Will Have It, WALL ST. J. (July 7, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles
/richard-clarke-on-the-future-of-privacy-only-the-rich-will-have-it-1404762349 [https://perma
.cc/85YA-QUNY].
82. RICK SMOLAN & JENNIFER ERWITT, THE HUMAN FACE OF BIG DATA (2012); Hatfield,
supra note 38, at 339–42; Hatfield, supra note 77, at 20; Solove, supra note 76, at 1394.
83. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2008 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3, 5 (2008),
https://www.irs.gov/advocate/national-taxpayer-advocates-2008-annual-report-to-congress
[https://perma.cc/B7B6-HK5X].
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Tax Complexity, Compliance, and Administration: The Merits of Simplification
in Tax Reform: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 114th Cong. 1–2 (2015) (statement of
Sen. Orrin Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.) (describing the costs of tax compliance as
larger than the economy of New Zealand); id. at 2–5 (2015) (statement of Sen. Wyden,
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an information problem. 87 Taxpayers have the burden to collect the relevant information, and then to inform themselves how the law applies to it, and then report their
conclusions to the government. So, like the tax gap, the compliance burden problem
seems best solved by IT.88
2. Tax Information
While it should be clear to even a casual observer why the IRS would pursue
better information technology, it is not likely clear how much information the IRS
needs. The IRS needs information on a great many individuals. There are about
145 million individual income tax returns filed annually, 89 reporting information
on about 290 million individuals each year. 90 There is no other government agency
that needs to collect information on so many individuals each year. In a country
with a population of 328 million,91 that figure represents nearly every individual in
the country.
It is not just a great many individuals, but a great amount of information on
many individuals that the IRS needs. The tax law can touch on almost any detail
of life, making those details become tax relevant. As greatly important as financial
information is, the range of tax relevant information is greater. Consider the
nonfinancial information reported on the face of the Form 1040. 92 The return
reveals not only the taxpayer’s job and current address but whether or not the
taxpayer has lost a job, prematurely invaded a retirement account, or moved fifty
or more miles away. 93 It not only identifies any dependent who is a college student
but also the dependent’s college, course of study, length of time studying, and
felony drug convictions. 94 Not only does the return reveal if the taxpayer is married
but whether or not the spouse is blind or disabled, or if the taxpayer’s spouse has

Ranking Member, S. Comm. on Fin.) (describing the tax returning filing process as painful);
Complexity and the Tax Gap: Making Tax Compliance Easier and Collecting What Is Due:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 112th Cong. 1–3 (2011) (statement of Sen. Baucus,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Fin.); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 83; see also Hatfield,
supra note 38, at 337–38.
87. Hatfield, supra note 38, at 332–35.
88. Id. at 339.
89. This Article is focused on the taxation of individuals.
90. BRYAN, supra note 19, at 5.
91. U.S. and World Population Clock, supra note 20. The U.S. income tax is imposed on
all United States Persons defined in I.R.C. § 7701(a)(30), which also includes residents of the
country.
92. This is the most commonly filed individual income tax return.
93. I.R.S. Form 1040, U.S. Individual Income Tax Return Signature Block (occupation);
Lines 15, 16, 20 (retirement benefits); Line 19 (unemployment benefits); Line 59 (early distributions from retirement accounts); Line 26 (moving expenses) [hereinafter I.R.S. Form
1040]; I.R.S. Form 3903, Moving Expenses; Hatfield, supra note 77, at 40–41.
94. I.R.S. Form 1040 Line 34 (tuition); I.R.S. Form 8863, Education Credits Line 22
(educational institution identifying information); Line 24 (study program and course load);
Line 25 (more than four years post-secondary education); Line 26 (drug-related felony conviction); Hatfield, supra note 77, at 41.
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recently died.95 It reveals whether or not the taxpayer and dependents have health
insurance or medical expenses.96 It shows the number of children who live with the
taxpayer and also shows the number of the taxpayer’s children who live with
someone else due to divorce or separation.97 If the taxpayer has adopted a child, it
reveals if the child has a disability, special needs, or is foreign born.98 The return also
shows whether the taxpayer has placed a child or disabled spouse in day care, and, if
so, the name and address of the day care provider.99
Although all of this information is on the face of the return, far more information
may be tax relevant and collected by the IRS. The IRS is authorized to demand
whatever information it determines relevant to a tax liability. 100 The IRS need not
suspect a taxpayer misreported any item or miscalculated a tax liability in order to
demand more detailed information. As I have explained elsewhere, the more detailed
information within the legal grasp of the IRS includes such detailed and deeply personal information as who sleeps how often in the taxpayer’s house, 101 the taxpayer’s

95. I.R.S. Form 1040, Lines 2, 4, and 5 (marital status); Lines 11 and 31a (alimony received and paid); Line 39a (blind spouse); I.R.S. Form 2441, Child and Dependent Care
Expenses (Part 2 (identifying care recipient)); Hatfield, supra note 77, at 41.
96. I.R.S. Form 1040, Line 61 (health care coverage); Line 40 (itemized deductions);
Schedule A, Itemized Deductions, Line 1 (medical and dental expenses); see Hatfield, supra
note 77, at 41.
97. I.R.S. Form 1040, Line 6 (dependent children exemptions); Hatfield, supra note 77,
at 41.
98. I.R.S. Form 8812, Additional Child Tax Credit; I.R.S. Form 1040, Line 54 (credits);
I.R.S. Form 8839, Qualified Adoption Expenses (disability, special needs, or foreign birth of
adopted child); Hatfield, supra note 77, at 41.
99. I.R.S. Form 2441, Child and Dependent Care Expenses (Part 1 (identifying care provider); Part 2 (identifying child or dependent)); Hatfield, supra note 77, at 41.
100. I.R.C. § 7602 (2012) (permitting the examination of books and records); I.R.C. § 7801
(granting authority to Treasury Department); I.R.C. § 7803 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-97)
(outlining the duties and authority of the IRS Commissioner). With respect to this tax-relevant
information, Congress has granted the Treasury broad authority to prescribe the taxpayer’s
obligations to provide the information. I.R.C. § 6001 (2012). The Secretary is entitled to require any person to “make such returns, render such statements, or keep such records as the
Secretary deems sufficient to show whether or not such person” has an income tax liability,
and every person who does have an income tax liability must “keep such records, render such
statements, make such returns, and comply with such rules and regulations as the Secretary”
prescribes. Id.; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.6001-1(a) (as amended in 1990); BORIS I. BITTKER,
MARTIN J. MCMAHON, JR. & LAWRENCE A. ZELENAK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF
INDIVIDUALS ¶ 39.01[8] (2013).
101. This information may be relevant to determining tax consequences of payments to a
separated spouse who is living in the taxpayer’s house and dependency status in the case of a
child. See I.R.C. § 71(b)(1)(C) (2012) (defining alimony payments to a separated spouse who
is in the same household as not excludable from income); I.R.C. § 152(c)(1)(B) (Westlaw
through Pub. L. 115-97) (defining a qualifying child as a dependent residing at the same principal place of abode as the taxpayer for more than one-half of the year); Treas. Reg. § 1.1521(b) (as amended in 1971) (defining the dependent including special circumstances of absences of less than six months); see also Hatfield, supra note 38, at 321 n.5.

2018]

C YBERS E CURI T Y A N D TAX REF OR M

1173

hobbies,102 reading preferences,103 religious affiliation,104 travel plans,105 weight and
his or her doctor’s recommendations about it, 106 the taxpayer’s or taxpayer’s spouse’s
or dependent’s abortion, sterilization, 107 gender identity disorder,108 and sexual relations.109 The IRS can even reach information about individuals who are not the taxpayer’s spouse or dependents, such as the taxpayer’s married children and the taxpayer’s lovers (including, for example, letters between the taxpayer and her lover). 110
3. Types of Future Attacks
To anticipate the types of attacks for which the IRS should be prepared, it is useful
to review the types of attacks perpetrated against other organizations. The IRS has
already been hit with financially motivated attacks, which may be the type of motivation we most often remember when we think of cyberattacks. Financially motivated cyberattacks are the use of new tools to commit old crimes, such as theft, fraud,

102. See Treas. Reg. § 1.183-2(b) (as amended in 1972) (listing factors for determining if
an activity is a hobby for which losses are not deductible).
103. Reading habits may be relevant, for example, to determine whether one has undertaken an activity with a motive of making a profit. See, e.g., Nickerson v. Comm’r, 700 F.2d
402, 407 (7th Cir. 1983) (stating that facts including a taxpayer’s reading about farming were
evidence that he pursued that activity with a profit-seeking motive).
104. Not only may financial support of religious organizations be tax relevant but also the
distance from a taxpayer’s home to any of her religious organizations. See I.R.C. §
170(b)(1)(A)(i) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-97) (covering charitable contributions and gifts
to a church or convention or association of churches); Treas. Reg. § 1.121-1(b)(vi) (as
amended in 2002) (stating that location of religious organization with which taxpayer affiliates
is relevant to determining principal residence for gain exclusion).
105. For example, was the travel for personal, business, educational, or medical purposes—or some combination? See I.R.C. § 213(a), (d)(1)–(2) (Westlaw through Pub. L. 11597) (stating that transportation and lodging expenses for medical care are deductible); Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-2 (as amended in 1960) (covering travel for business, mixed business, and personal reasons); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (as amended in 1967) (covering travel as a form of
education).
106. See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-04-111 (Oct. 31, 1979) (setting out weight loss program
fees as deductible where prescribed by physicians for the alleviation of specific ailments);
Rev. Rul. 79-151, 1979-1 C.B. 116 (noting that weight loss program fees are not deductible
even though physician-recommended where not prescribed for the alleviation of specific ailment).
107. See Rev. Rul. 73-201, 1973-1 C.B. 140 (deeming legal abortions and vasectomies
deductible medical care under I.R.C. § 213).
108. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (deeming breast reconstruction following mastectomy to be deductible). But see O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34, 70–71
(2010) (finding that hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery are deductible expenses
to treat “gender identity disorder” disease but that breast augmentation was merely cosmetic
and not a deductible expense).
109. Transfers to a sexual partner may be characterized as either nontaxable gifts or as
taxable compensation for sexual activity. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 942 F.2d 1125,
1131–35 (7th Cir. 1991) (reviewing the “current law on the tax treatment of payments to mistresses”).
110. Hatfield, supra note 77, at 45–47.

1174

INDIA NA LA W J OU R NA L

[Vol. 93:1161

and extortion.111 The IRS has been attacked to steal refunds and taxpayer information, but it has yet to be hit with ransomware, which is an increasingly common
malware. It restricts an organization’s access to its own system or information (e.g.,
customers’ orders or contact information) until the attacker is paid. For example,
online casinos have been targeted with demands for payment and threats to disrupt
their sites just as Super Bowl or World Cup betting began. 112 Imagine the information
held by the IRS being held for ransom, just as April 16 began and individual taxpayers had just finished filing their return, payments, and claims for refunds. 113
However, many breaches of cybersecurity are not financially motivated. For example, there may be an attack by an insider who has an idiosyncratic motive.
Organizational insiders are especially worrisome as their position inside the organization allows access that outsiders would need a great deal of technical expertise to
obtain.114 Particularly dangerous to cybersecurity are the disgruntled insiders who
seek revenge against the organization for personal wrongs. 115 For example, after he
learned of his pending termination, a network administrator for the City of San
Francisco held the city’s computer systems hostage, preventing access to information, including police and payroll files. 116 While disgruntled insiders are a risk at
any organization, the IRS has over 80,000 employees, who are overworked and underappreciated and difficult to retain,117 and, as has been revealed recently, the IRS
regularly fails to remove computer access privileges from former employees, including those subjected to disciplinary proceedings. 118 As the IRS increases its store of
digital information, the risk of a disgruntled insider holding information hostage or
disabling the IRS computer system also increases.
There also are politically motivated cyberattacks. These attacks, often by
“hacktivists,”119 such as Anonymous,120 often make headline news and often are

111. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 4.
112. See P.W. SINGER & ALLAN FRIEDMAN, CYBERSECURITY AND CYBERWAR: WHAT
EVERYONE NEEDS TO KNOW 36, 88 (2014).
113. See, e.g., Chris Frates, IRS Believes Massive Data Theft Originated in Russia, CNN
POLITICS (June 4, 2015, 9:23 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2015/05/27/politics/irs-cyber-breachrussia [https://perma.cc/H3TS-36N8].
114. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 22, at 4.
115. Id.
116. Jaxon Van Derbeken, Ex-S.F. Tech Guilty of Walling Off City System, SFGATE (Apr.
28, 2010, 4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/crime/article/Ex-S-F-tech-guilty-of-walling-offcity-system-3190937.php [https://perma.cc/5EAE-8ESG].
117. See infra Part II.C.
118. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., ACCESS TO GOVERNMENT FACILITIES
AND COMPUTERS IS NOT ALWAYS REMOVED WHEN EMPLOYEES SEPARATE 1–3 (2016).
119. The first use of this term is often credited to the Cult of the Dead Cow, a group whose
name reflects its operation’s headquarters in an old slaughterhouse in Lubbock, Texas. Their
early efforts included hacking “Chinese government agencies and Western companies cooperating with them” as part of their dedication to fighting internet censorship. SINGER &
FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 77.
120. Anonymous’s headline attacks (on religious groups, large corporations, and foreign
governments) and Guy Fawkes masks probably make them the best-known hacktivists in the
world. Id. at 78, 80–84; see also Anonymous Activist Forum, WHYWEPROTEST, https://
whyweprotest.net [https://perma.cc/EWC3-HKRK].
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against high profile targets. Government, corporations, human rights organizations,
and religious groups have all been attacked for political purposes.121 Over 100,000
Russian hacktivists launched a denial-of-service attack against the Estonian government for removing a Russian grave marker.122 Iranian hacktivists attacked a U.S.
business for its owner’s political support of Israel. 123 About 100,000 Chinese
hacktivists knocked out the White House website and planted viruses in the Justice
Department’s network in retaliation for a collision of U.S. and Chinese planes. 124
Imagine the IRS as the target of a politically motivated attack such as a massive
denial of service.125 There is quite a history of anti-IRS sentiment: anti-IRS activists
have attacked IRS property, stolen files, threatened IRS employees, and even killed
IRS employees in the past.126 Given the visibility of the IRS, and both its symbolic
and practical role of revenue collection for the federal government, it is easy to imagine an attack against the IRS motivated by antipathy to the IRS or to U.S. foreign
or other policies.
While politically motivated attacks may attempt to embarrass a government, impede its functioning, and frustrate its citizens, politically motivated breaches also
may be aimed at securing and disclosing certain information. For example, Edward
Snowden stole 1.7 million records from the National Security Agency (NSA)
—records with more top secrets than had ever been stolen from the U.S.
government—in order to disclose politically objectionable behavior by the NSA. 127

121. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 78, 80–84; see also Anonymous Activist
Forum, supra note 120; Significant Cyber Incidents, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
https://www.csis.org/programs/strategic-technologies-program/cybersecurity/significant-cyberevents [https://perma.cc/FH5A-RS6N].
122. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 111.
123. Significant Cyber Incidents Since 2006, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT’L STUD.,
https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/171006_Significant_Cyber_Events_List.pdf
[https://perma.cc/RU2W-7ZMD] (2014 Las Vegas incident).
124. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 78.
125. A “denial-of-service” attack is one that impairs the authorized use of a system. It is
an intentional overwhelming of a system so that authorized users are unable to access it. It is
as if someone were so persistently dialing your phone number, no one could get a call through
to you. Except, of course, it is not merely a single user’s phone number that is taken out of
service, but all of a bank’s customers’ access, for example. These attacks often are a coordinated effort of many individual attackers. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note
22, at 5; SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 44.
126. Michael Brick, Man Crashes Plane into Texas I.R.S Office, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/us/19crash.html [https://perma.cc/C2DP-RBPZ];
Benedict Carey, When Does Political Anger Turn to Violence?, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 27, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/28/weekinreview/28carey.html [https://perma.cc/GC96W7UY]; Joe Weisenthal, The Insane Manifesto of Austin Texas Crash Pilot Joseph Andrew
Stack, BUS. INSIDER (Feb. 18, 2010, 1:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/joseph-andrewstacks-insane-manifesto-2010-2 [https://perma.cc/88HA-UBGE]; Robert W. Welkos & Joel
Sappell, Burglaries and Lies Paved a Path to Prison, L.A. TIMES (June 24, 1990),
http://www.latimes.com/local/la-scientologysidec062490-story.html [https://perma.cc/UMN9JBDD].
127. Chris Strohm & Del Quentin Wilber, Pentagon Says Snowden Took Most U.S. Secrets
Ever: Rogers, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 10, 2014, 1:01 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
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While IRS operations do not have the top political secrecy the NSA’s operations do,
some of its operations raise significant political objections. For example, consider
the ongoing saga of the IRS review of Section 501(c)(4) applications by right-leaning
groups in the United States, which has led to a finding against the IRS in court, 128 the
resignation of key IRS employees,129 bills intended to slash IRS power, and a push
for the impeachment of the IRS commissioner. 130 In addition to information on IRS
activities, the IRS, of course, has a great deal of information on taxpayers that may
be of political interest. Consider, for example, how the disclosure of the
compensation paid by Sony followed the 2014 cyberattack against Sony and the
damage to Sony that followed the disclosure. 131 This type of information is readily
held by the IRS, as is information as to the tax liabilities of the wealthy, the powerful,
and the controversial—and, potentially, information on their health, families, and
various activities, as described in more detail below.
Another type of cyberattack is one intended to affect the political process. There
have been hacks of political parties and political campaigns with the intention of
finding and disclosing embarrassing information.132 That these attacks appear to have
been organized and conducted from outside the United States underscores the rapidly
changing nature of cyberattacks.133 The use of tax information against political enemies by government insiders is not unknown in the United States, though concerns
over this use led to greater legal protection for tax information. 134 With tax information increasingly digitized and vulnerable to cyber theft, legal protection is not
real protection, and the threat is not just by those within the government or even
within the United States who might seek tax information on political adversaries.
This may be tax information of individual candidates who refuse voluntary revelation,135 or it may be other information contained in tax records that reveal relationships among taxpayers not otherwise public or other details of a targeted taxpayer’s
personal or family life.

/articles/2014-01-10/pentagon-says-snowden-took-most-u-s-secrets-ever-rogers [https://perma
.cc/7MET-CAZR].
128. True the Vote, Inc. v. IRS, 831 F.3d 551 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
129. Josh Hicks, Central Figure in IRS Tea Party Controversy Resigns, WASH. POST (Sept.
23, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/federal_government/central-figure-in-irstea-party-controversy-resigns/2013/09/23/db0d3d28-248a-11e3-b75d-5b7f66349852_story
.html [https://perma.cc/B7Z5-RU8L].
130. Paul Caron, The IRS Scandal, Day 1108, TAXPROF BLOG (May 21, 2016),
http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2016/05/the-irs-scandal-day-1108.html [https://perma
.cc/KD4V-SQ9C].
131. Sony To Pay Staff $8M Compensation over Cyber Attack, BBC (Nov. 26, 2015),
https://www.bbc.com/news/entertainment-arts-34931148 [https://perma.cc/6WCY-C7JD].
132. David E. Sanger & Nick Corasaniti, D.N.C. Says Russian Hackers Penetrated Its
Files, Including Dossier on Donald Trump, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2016), http://nyti.ms
/1S4a1Dw [https://perma.cc/DGR4-VDS8].
133. David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Spy Agency Consensus Grows that Russia Hacked
D.N.C., N.Y. TIMES (July 26, 2016), http://nyti.ms/29Yfv9A [https://perma.cc/M848-7MCL].
134. See generally Hatfield, supra note 77.
135. David Barstow, Susanne Craig, Russ Buettner & Megan Twohey, Donald Trump Tax
Records Show He Could Have Avoided Taxes for Nearly Two Decades, The Times Found,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 1, 2016), http://nyti.ms/2d51X9E [https://perma.cc/983X-QF6U].
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Cyberattacks can cross into physical attacks. The Department of Homeland
Security has reported the U.S. electrical grid has been persistently probed by unauthorized foreign actors and that twenty-three gas pipeline companies have had information stolen, presumably for sabotage purposes.136 The energy sectors in Spain,
France, Italy, Turkey, and Poland have all been hacked.137 Concerns over physical
destruction waged through IT have motivated governments to develop information
warfare programs and capabilities.138 The most high-profile instance of such an attack is Stuxnet, a worm that destroyed centrifuges at an Iranian nuclear facility.139
Stuxnet was extraordinarily sophisticated and powerful, and apparently an intensive
collaborative effort of the United States and Israel to produce a unique weapon with
a unique purpose.140 While it is unlikely weapons like Stuxnet will soon become
common, its development was “the absolute game changer” in global security. 141 It
bought the world into “an arms race where countries start stocking weapons, only it
isn’t planes and nuclear reactors they’re stocking, but it’s cyberweapons.” 142
What would be the equivalent of such an attack through the IRS? Cybersecurity
experts have warned of attacks on a nation’s economy.143 An attack on the U.S. economy easily can be imagined. A short-term denial-of-service attack on the IRS, as
mentioned above, would not only have symbolic consequences but would cost taxpayers and the IRS time, money, and frustration. But imagine the consequences of
taking the IRS “offline” for months, not hours. Imagine an adversary targeting not
the utilities infrastructure of the United States but the U.S. revenue collection infrastructure. While terrorists brought down the World Trade Center on 9/11, the IRS
could be a “Cyber 9/11” target, taking it down would be taking down revenue collection and stirring up chaos by destroying data evidencing payments, filings, and all
other taxpayer information.
Cyber weapons like Stuxnet achieve the ages-old war goal of physical destruction,
merely using information technology as a new method. However, the rapidly expanding power of IT has produced new war goals that are more complex and more difficult to discern. One such goal is stealing as much data as can be stolen. Once massive
data is stolen, the attacker can then use cutting-edge, “big data” algorithms to mine

136. Mark Clayton, Exclusive: Cyberattack Leaves Natural Gas Pipelines Vulnerable to
Sabotage, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 27, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com
/Environment/2013/0227/Exclusive-Cyberattack-leaves-natural-gas-pipelines-vulnerable-tosabotage [https://perma.cc/63BS-MFYB]; Michael Riley & Jordan Robertson, UglyGorilla
Hack of U.S. Utility Exposes Cyberwar Threat, BLOOMBERG (June 13, 2014, 5:01 PM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-06-13/uglygorilla-hack-of-u-s-utilityexposes-cyberwar-threat [https://perma.cc/59FT-EZF6].
137. Energy Firms Hacked by ‘Cyber-Espionage Group Dragonfly,’ BBC (July 1, 2014),
https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-28106478 [https://perma.cc/N8LN-H6CY].
138. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO 15-573T, CYBERSECURITY: ACTIONS
NEEDED TO ADDRESS CHALLENGES FACING FEDERAL SYSTEMS 2 (2015).
139. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 114–18.
140. Id. at 117–18.
141. Id. at 118 (quoting Mikko Hypponen).
142. Id. (quoting Mikko Hypponen).
143. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 4; Dan Holden, Is CyberTerrorism the New Normal?, WIRED (Jan. 2015), http://www.wired.com/insights/2015/01/iscyber-terrorism-the-new-normal [https://perma.cc/TZS4-6T57].
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usefulness from the information. The Chinese government has been said to organize
its hackers into a “vacuum cleaner” to suck up electronic information for big data
mining.144 The Chinese government is also said to be “becoming much more sophisticated in tying” data together in useful ways.145 Both the theft of data on four million
government employees from the OPM and tens of millions individuals whose health
care was insured by Anthem were part of the Chinese government’s effort, as have
been many other big data thefts.146 The Chinese government’s goal appears to be
building “massive databases of Americans’ personal information.” 147 Among other
uses of the data may be identifying potential intelligence targets within the United
States, as well as their weaknesses, histories, and personal relationships and identifying individuals within China who have relationships with Americans. 148 If the current stores of information held by the IRS are the “gold standard” for cyber thieves,
a future in which the IRS pursues cutting-edge IT, rather than being tied to magnetic
tapes, as it currently is,149 tax account information will be even more appealing. A
single agency would house sensitive information on almost everyone in the country.
But vacuum cleaner attacks are not the cutting-edge of cyberattacks. The cuttingedge is not stealing the data but manipulating it.150 Intelligence experts believe that
this is a far greater risk than the use of cyber weapons. 151 This “data sabotage” may
be used to affect the decisions of corporate executives, investors, and government
officials.152 As damaging as it might be for an adversary to take down the IRS, or to
steal all the information held by the IRS, a cutting-edge cyberattack would be an
adversarial power controlling the IRS by manipulating its data. Such control could
wreak havoc not only on the taxpayers involved and the IRS itself, but reverberate
economically and politically, undermining not only taxpayer confidence and the ability of the IRS to collect revenue but also the confidence of Americans in the federal
government’s ability to function.
II. THE IRS WILL FAIL TO IMPLEMENT ADEQUATE CYBERSECURITY
There are several reasons to predict the IRS will fail to develop adequate
cybersecurity. One reason, explained in Part II.A, is the IRS’s poor track record improving its technology over the past forty years. As explained in Part II.B, another
reason is expecting the IRS to be underresourced indefinitely. Part II.C outlines a
third reason to doubt: it is unlikely the IRS can recruit and retain the needed technical
expertise. As discussed in Part II.D, a fourth reason to predict IRS failure is that

144. Nakashima, supra note 15.
145. Id.
146. See id.
147. Id.
148. See id.
149. See infra notes 157–67.
150. This is according to the former U.S. director of national intelligence, James Clapper,
and the director of the NSA, Admiral Michael Rogers. Ackerman, supra note 17.
151. Id.
152. Maggie Overfelt, The Next Big Threat in Hacking—Data Sabotage, CNBC (Mar. 9,
2016, 6:56 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/03/09/the-next-big-threat-in-hacking--datasabotage.html [https://perma.cc/Y5KC-GU9Y].
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success would require a system used not only by the tens of thousands of IRS employees but hundreds of millions of taxpayers, third-party reporters, and outside professionals. Finally, the fifth reason to doubt is set forth in Part II.E: cybersecurity is
too difficult for most organizations, and no organization does what the IRS does—
annually process hundreds of millions of returns, pay hundreds of billions of refunds,
and collect trillions in payment.
A. Very Poor History of Improving Technology
The IRS history with computerization began very early, at the close of World War
II. What in 1917 had been an income tax requiring only 3.5 million individual returns
to be filed153 had, as a result of funding World War II, become a tax on 42.6 million.154 The difficulties of tracking 42 million taxpayers prompted the IRS155 to begin
experimenting with automation in 1948.156 Ten years later, the IRS formalized its
plan for “Automated Data Processing” (ADP).157 The ADP plan was for regional
centers to record tax information onto magnetic tape, which would then be posted
once a week to a “National Computer Center” in Martinsburg, West Virginia, that
would house mainframes with a master file on each taxpayer (the “IMF system”).
Within five years, ADP was operating, 158 and in fewer than ten years—that is, by
1967—was fully implemented: every tax return was handled through ADP and the
National Computer Center maintained a master file on every taxpayer. 159 The IRS
then began pursuing significant improvements: using keyboards to transcribe data

153. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., IRS HISTORICAL FACT BOOK: A CHRONOLOGY 91 (1993).
154. W. ELLIOT BROWNLEE, FEDERAL TAXATION IN AMERICA: A SHORT HISTORY 115
(2004).
155. The IRS was at the time known as the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR).
156. Sheldon S. Cohen, Automation and Tax Administration, 28 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 69
(1967) (arguing that automation in tax administration facilitates the IRS’s ability to effectively
and accurately administer the tax code); Robert L. Jack, Internal Revenue Service Automatic
Data Processing System and Its Significance to Taxpayers and Their Representatives, 8
JURIMETRICS J. 1, 2 (1966) (arguing that the automation in data processing benefited the IRS’s
capacity, while noting some problems). In 1948, return processing was essentially as had it
been in 1862 (when first federal income tax had been introduced). Bryan T. Camp, Theory and
Practice in Tax Administration, 29 VA. TAX REV. 227, 246 (2009) (arguing that automation in
tax administration gave rise to new problems for the IRS such as centralization and insufficient
personnel to effectively serve). The BIR began experimenting with automation by first automating mass mailing with a punch card system. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at
143.
157. The 1958 plan followed a 1955 experiment in which over a million returns were processed with computers. These returns were Form 1040As filed in the Omaha Region.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at 161. Also, by 1958, the IRS was using a computer shared with the Bureau of the Census for compiling statistics. Id. at 161, 163–64.
Congress approved ADP in 1959. Id. at 166, 174; Camp, supra note 156, at 243.
158. By 1962, ADP was processing business returns. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra
note 153, at 176; Cohen, supra note 156, at 69.
159. Mortimer M. Caplin, Commissioner Caplin Reviews His Record as IRS Chief, 29 VA.
TAX REV. 177, 178 (2009); Cohen, supra note 156, at 69–70.
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directly to tape;160 implementing algorithms to identify returns with a high probability of error;161 using computers to determine how to improve compliance and collection;162 developing ways for forms to be submitted on magnetic tape;163 automating
deposit and payments;164 and even experimenting with IRS employees using microcomputers to prepare returns for taxpayers while they waited. 165 IRS computer operations were held out as an example for the private sector,166 and foreign governments
sought IRS help in moving their systems toward computerization.167
Buoyed by a successful first decade of computerization, the IRS set out to transform its system.168 In 1975, the plan for transformation—the Tax Administration
System (TAS)—was approved for implementation. 169 TAS focused on improving
how taxpayer accounts would be developed and maintained, computerizing applications used by agents, reducing errors, and smoothing audits. 170 But the plan quickly
fell to Watergate-era political anxieties about the inappropriate use of private information held by the IRS.171 There was no political appetite for increasing the computerization of the IRS; Congress was only willing to fund the replacement of old equipment, not the upgrade.172
Within a decade of announcing TAS, computerization at the IRS was in shambles.
The 1985 filing season was the worst in IRS history: insufficient computer capacity
tanked taxpayer service.173 It was a technological, public relations, and political disaster.174 The Treasury Department rejected IRS requests for additional funding for

160. Herman J. Rothberg, A Study of the Impact of Office Automation in the IRS, 92
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 26, 30 (1969).
161. Singleton B. Wolfe, The Use of Computers in Tax Administration, 17 JURIMETRICS J.
215, 215 (1977); see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at 191.
162. Cohen, supra note 156, at 72.
163. Magnetic tape reporting was used by 591 entities in 1966. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
supra note 153, at 183; Jack, supra note 156, at 6–7.
164. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at 197.
165. The four sites were Boston, Brooklyn, Philadelphia, and Washington; at two other
sites, the IRS offered to taxpayers a review of their returns for accuracy before they were filed.
Id. at 201.
166. See Rothberg, supra note 160, at 26.
167. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at 176.
168. Id. at 191.
169. Id. at 191, 207.
170. Id. at 191; Elana Varon, E-Government: IRS Modernization—Will Third Time Be the
Charm?, CIO (Apr. 1, 2001, 8:00 AM), http://www.cio.com/article/2441695/processimprovement/e-government--irs-modernization--will-third-time-be-the-charm-.html [https://
perma.cc/PG3G-VDTL].
171. After Nixon’s political use of the IRS, there were hearings on the use of executive
orders, which Nixon then revoked. The political climate at the time was concerned with the
vast gathering of information, and eventually led to the 1974 Privacy Act. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at 212; Hatfield, supra note 77.
172. This was known as the Equipment Replacement Program (ERP). INTERNAL REVENUE
SERV., supra note 153, at 212–13.
173. Id. at 215, 223; Varon, supra note 170.
174. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 153, at 215.
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modernizing its technology on grounds that the IRS had no comprehensive modernization plan.175
In 1988, over twenty years after ADP had been fully implemented, the IRS formalized a comprehensive modernization plan: the Tax System Modernization plan
(TSM).176 The primary goal of TSM was to replace the 1960s IMF system at the
National Computing Center with a state-of-the-art network.177 In pursuit of this stateof-the-art network, the IRS quickly spent $4 billion. 178 Unfortunately, the systems
the IRS developed “d[id] not work in the real world.” 179 As a result, Congress cut
funding for TSM,180 and the President appointed an IRS commissioner with a hightech, business background.181 In describing the situation with IRS technology at this
time, one former IRS executive said the IRS had spent billions of dollars in order to
rebuild a 1960 Chevy.182 The IRS system still relied on “a series of very large tape
files—virtually unheard of” as still being used in the late 1990s.183 Except for a small
amount of data that had been put on separate integrated data retrieval system for use
by frontline employees,184 taxpayer data could not be accessed or updated on a realtime basis.185 Once a week, in a process that took three days, taxpayer data was updated at the National Computing Center.186
In 1997, the new commissioner launched a new, $7 billion plan: Business Systems
Modernization (BSM).187 The plan included replacing the thirty-five-year-old magnetic tape system at the National Computing Center with a modern database, the
Customer Account Data Engine (CADE).188 This was the third major plan in twenty

175. See id. at 223.
176. Id. at 230, 236.
177. Varon, supra note 170.
178. Zach Noble, The Taxman’s Tech Troubles, FCW (Apr. 8, 2016), https://fcw.com
/articles/2016/04/08/taxman-tech-troubles.aspx [https://perma.cc/VQ5E-BQVA].
179. Id.
180. Congress cut the funding in 1995. James R. Thompson, Fixing the IRS, GOV’T
EXECUTIVE (Apr. 1, 2012), http://www.govexec.com/magazine/features/2012/04/fixingirs/41637 [https://perma.cc/2YMR-FA6A].
181. Charles Rossotti was appointed in 1997. George Guttman, The IRS: Still Trying To
Modernize, 30 Years Later, 86 TAX NOTES 723, 725 (2000).
182. Id. at 726.
183. Charles O. Rossotti, Modernizing the IRS, 1 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 17, 21 (1999).
184. This information was stored on the Integrated Data Retrieval System (IDRS).
Guttman, supra note 181, at 725.
185. Id.
186. See Rossotti, supra note 183, at 21.
187. James R. Thompson, System Error, GOV’T EXECUTIVE (Sept. 1, 1996), https://
www.govexec.com/magazine/1996/09/system-error/405 [https://perma.cc/P2GS-VRX2].
BSM was a fifteen-year plan, intended to phase in the modern database, beginning with the
simplest of taxpayer accounts (a subset of Form 1040EZ filers) in 2002. See INTERNAL
REVENUE SERV., BUSINESS SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM PROGRESS REPORT 8, 9, 33,
(2000), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/bsm-prog.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJL2-CKHN]. For a
discussion of the political context of the reforms at the IRS in the 1990s, see Leandra
Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971 (2003).
188. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 187, at 6.
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years to update the National Computing Center. 189 However, unlike the other plans,
the new commissioner’s plan relied not on inside but outside tech experts. 190 But,
due to both IRS management failures and the failures of the outside tech experts to
understand the IRS processes, the BSM was soon behind schedule and over budget,
prompting the Government Accountability Office to conclude that the BSM was too
ambitious for the IRS to pursue.191
In 2008, almost a decade after the new commissioner announced BSM, the IRS
had a new commissioner who scaled down the other aspects of BSM so as to have a
single goal: fully implementing CADE.192 While some progress had been made with
CADE,193 the 1960s IMF system at the National Computing Center remained the
center of IRS computing,194 decades after other organizations had begun using modern databases.195 Despite the single focus, over the next few years, the budget for
CADE was exceeded and the goals for CADE were lowered.196 Some progress was
made, including enabling the daily rather than weekly processing and posting of
some information.197 But project delays and cost overruns continued.198
By 2016, CADE was still not fully implemented and the push to fully replace the
IMF system at the National Computing Center had slowed.199 Sounding resigned, the
technical director for strategic planning at the IRS described the system in 2016 as
“not broken” but “difficult to maintain.”200 Describing a system developed piecemeal
over the prior fifty years, the IRS commissioner said, “We’ve got more IT challenges
than you can shake a stick at . . . [we have] literally thousands of patches [and] security upgrades [and] we don't have the resources to implement them all.” 201 With so
many problems, the IRS could not focus on fully implementing CADE. Even though
the IRS technology budget had reached $2.4 billion—over 20% of its total annual
budget—both its focus and its budget were on nineteen separate, “major” investments.202 CADE was competing with projects to implement the Affordable Care

189. See Guttman, supra note 181, at 725.
190. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 187, at 8.
191. Thompson, supra note 180; see also INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PROGRESS REPORT
33–34 (2001), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/pub3970_2-2002.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8QGM5PF].
192. The new IRS commissioner was Doug Shulman. Thompson, supra note 180.
193. Some progress had been made: about fifteen million of the simplest tax returns were
being processed with CADE in 2008. Noble, supra note 178.
194. Thompson, supra note 180.
195. Id.; see also Brianna Ehley, The IRS’s Unusual IT ‘Success Story’ Is Failing, FISCAL
TIMES (Nov. 26, 2013), http://www.thefiscaltimes.com/Articles/2013/11/26/IRS-s-One-ITSuccess-Story-Failing [https://perma.cc/S9MQ-4CTP].
196. See Jack Moore, When IRS Tech Projects Start To Slip, Congress Is the Last To Know,
NEXTGOV (Mar. 2, 2015), http://www.nextgov.com/cio-briefing/2015/03/when-irs-tech-projectsstart-slip-congress-last-know/106449.
197. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 3–4.
198. Moore, supra note 196.
199. By 2016, it was CADE 2. Noble, supra note 178.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Each of these cost at least $10 million annually. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
supra note 28, at 3.
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Act203 and the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act; 204 “to eliminate the issuance
of fraudulent tax refunds”;205 to provide web-based services to taxpayers, support
electronic filing, convert paper returns into electronic format;206 and a dozen other
major projects, including, of course, funding the maintenance of the magnetic tapes
and mainframes at the National Computing Center.207 Moreover, “[o]f all the federal
agencies, IRS [was] maybe suffering the most in terms of an IT backlog.”208 The
backlog, patched system, and lack of focus mean that even routine IT maintenance
goals fail to be met. For example, between 2011 and 2015, the IRS spent $139 million
to update its workstations from Windows 2003 to Windows XP—and failed.209
While the history of technology modernization at the IRS does not inspire confidence for its future, there have been some successes. Indeed, until the 2015
cyberattacks, the public-facing technology used by the IRS was largely a success
story.210 Over 125 million returns are now filed electronically, 211 which is 86% of the
total individual returns filed.212 This can be attributed to the Internal Revenue Service
Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 (RRA),213 which required that the IRS develop ways for taxpayers to access their accounts online and file tax returns electronically.214 It mandated that 80% of all returns be filed electronically within a decade, 215
and that, more generally, the IRS “convert its interactions with taxpayers and practitioners to electronic form as rapidly as possible.”216 It also established a special funding mechanism for these efforts217 and charged the Treasury Inspector General for
Tax Administration with annually evaluating the IRS’s progress.218 With the RRA,
Congress forced prioritization of public-facing technology.219 Politically, this was
understandable, as it responded to massive complaints about difficulties interacting
with the IRS. And, practically, the most significant positive developments in IRS IT
have been with the electronic filing mandated by Congress. 220 But Congress’s decision about technology also meant a de-prioritization of the technology used by the

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.

Noble, supra note 178.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 3–4.
Id. at 4.
Id.
See id.
Noble, supra note 178 (quoting Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA)).
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 2.
Noble, supra note 178.
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-151, 2015 TAX FILING SEASON:
DETERIORATING TAXPAYER SERVICE UNDERSCORES NEED FOR A COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGY
AND PROCESS EFFICIENCIES 28 (2015).
212. Id.
213. Guttman, supra note 181, at 725.
214. Varon, supra note 170.
215. Thompson, supra note 180.
216. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 187, at 21.
217. Id. at 3.
218. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2005-20-102, ANNUAL ASSESSMENT
OF THE BUSINESS SYSTEMS MODERNIZATION PROGRAM 1 (2005).
219. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 187, at 3, 21; Guttman, supra note 181, at 725;
Thompson, supra note 180; Varon, supra note 170.
220. Noble, supra note 178; Thompson, supra note 180.
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IRS to process returns, payments, and refunds. Public-facing programs like electronic filing have been something of a façade, obscuring the greater technological
needs of the IRS. But the façade is no longer obscuring these needs. It is the electronic filing program that enables the filing of fraudulent returns with payments made
to criminals’ bank accounts.221 And it was the Get Transcript program that enabled
criminals to steal personal information to sell, to use in other crimes, and to file even
“better” fraudulent returns in the future.222
B. Inadequate Funding
In 2016, the House Appropriations Committee approved cutting the IRS budget
to lower than its 2008 level.223 Given recent funding cuts, this was not much of a
surprise.224 While IRS funding has been decreasing, its work load has been increasing. The number of tax returns has increased,225 as has the number of tasks assigned
the IRS by Congress, such as its duties implementing the Affordable Care Act. 226
Concern over the funding cuts, especially their negative impacts on individual taxpayers, has been widely expressed. The IRS Oversight Board,227 the National
Taxpayer Advocate,228 the IRS Advisory Council,229 the Treasury Inspector General
for Tax Affairs,230 and tax scholars231 have pointed to the serious problems caused

221. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 62–65 and accompanying text.
223. Press Release, U.S. House of Representatives Comm. on Appropriations,
Appropriations Committee Releases Fiscal Year 2017 Financial Services Bill (May 24, 2016),
http://appropriations.house.gov/news/documentsingle.aspx?DocumentID=394563 [https://
perma.cc/F6ST-LQB5]; Naomi Jagoda, House Panel Votes To Cut IRS Funding, HILL (June
9, 2016, 2:47 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/finance/282916-house-panel-approves-bill-thatcuts-irs-funding [https://perma.cc/BX39-W33Z].
224. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2014 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS vii (2014);
Jonathan Barry Forman & Roberta F. Mann, Making the Internal Revenue Service Work, 17
FLA. TAX REV. 725, 764 (2015).
225. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 224, at 9–10; Forman & Mann, supra note 224,
at 763–64.
226. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 224, at 12; Forman & Mann, supra note 224, at
774.
227. See, e.g., IRS OVERSIGHT BD., FY 2015 IRS BUDGET RECOMMENDATION SPECIAL REPORT
11 (2014).
228. See, e.g., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ix, 21 (2013).
229. See, e.g., INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. ADVISORY COUNCIL 2014 PUBLIC REPORT 9 (2014),
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/2014-IRSAC-Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/BGT7-WDM5].
230. See, e.g., TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2014-10-025,
IMPLEMENTATION OF FISCAL YEAR 2013 SEQUESTRATION BUDGET REDUCTIONS 9 (2014).
231. See, e.g., Forman & Mann, supra note 224, at 763–72; Leandra Lederman, The IRS,
Politics, and Income Inequality, 150 TAX NOTES 1329, 1329 (2016); Bryan Camp, Overlooked
Costs of IRS Budget Cuts Will Hit Taxpayers Hardest, CONVERSATION (Apr. 14, 2015, 5:49
AM),
https://theconversation.com/overlooked-costs-of-irs-budget-cuts-will-hit-taxpayershardest-39762 [https://perma.cc/QLS7-N6N9].
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by so limiting the resources for the IRS. But with many members of Congress convinced that reducing funding will increase efficiency, 232 no one is predicting funding
will be increasing. At this point, funding has so decreased that it would require a
significant increase to return future funding to past levels.
Given that—despite billions spent233—the IRS already has more information
technology problems “than you can shake a stick at” 234 and suffers the greatest IT
backlog of all federal agencies,235 it is most unlikely that it will be able to meet its
cybersecurity needs without an extraordinary increase in funding specifically for the
task. That seems extraordinarily unlikely. In the current bill approved by the House
Appropriations Committee, there is $290 million specifically set aside as additional
spending on cybersecurity, customer service, and fraud prevention.236 While
cybersecurity is related to customer service and fraud prevention, to lump these three
together spotlights the absence of congressional concern to push the cybersecurity
for tax information to a cutting-edge state. It is also not encouraging to recognize that
the $290 million is about twice what the IRS spent trying and failing to upgrade from
Windows 2003.237 Even if Congress were willing to write the checks, there is no
reason to believe the IRS would use the money successfully.
C. Inability To Recruit and Retain Experts
A third reason to doubt the IRS will be able to provide adequate cybersecurity is
that it is unlikely to recruit and retain the needed experts. In general, the IRS has
significant personnel problems. In 2014, it employed a total of 91,018 employees,
which is about the same level as in the 1970s. Between 2011 and 2015, the agency
lost 18,138 employees—a decline of 16.7%.238 Its employees are overworked, overwhelmed, and miserable.239 The IRS especially struggles to recruit and retain its most

232. See, e.g., Colleen Murphy, House Appropriations Bill Cuts IRS Funding by $236
Million, BLOOMBERG BNA (May 25, 2016), http://www.bna.com/house-appropriations-billn57982072964 (Representative Ander Crenshaw criticized the agency as inefficient and for “a
history of inappropriate behavior”).
233. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 2.
234. Noble, supra note 178 (quoting IRS commissioner John Koskinen).
235. Id. (quoting Rep. Gerry Connolly (D-VA)).
236. Jagoda, supra note 223.
237. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 27, at 2.
238. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2014 DATA BOOK 70 tbl.31 (2015); Lisa Rein, Declining
IRS Workforce Leaves Calls Unanswered as Tax Day Approaches, Union Says, WASH. POST
(Apr. 6, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/federal-eye/wp/2015/04/06/decliningforce-of-irs-employees-leaves-calls-unanswered-as-tax-day-approaches-union-says [https://
perma.cc/76KR-2DRZ].
239. William Hoffman, Almost Half of IRS Leadership Gone Since 2011, Koskinen Says,
147 TAX NOTES 33, 33–34 (2015); William Hoffman, Koskinen’s Tough Job Likely To Get
Tougher in 2015, 146 TAX NOTES 18, 18–19 (2015); William Hoffman & Tom Kasprzak,
Omnibus Prompts IRS Hiring Freeze, Travel Cuts, 145 TAX NOTES 1323, 1323 (2014);
Koskinen Outlines How 2015 Budget Cuts Will Affect IRS Employees, 2015 TAX NOTES TODAY
9–18 (Jan. 13, 2015); Devin Leonard & Richard Rubin, An Emotional Audit: IRS Workers Are
Miserable and Overwhelmed, BLOOMBERG BNA (Apr. 8, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com
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valuable employees.240 In addition to the difficulty of retaining valuable employees
in a low morale work force, the IRS is also hampered by the limited compensation it
can offer and the bureaucratic constrictions of federal recruitment and employment.241
While the IRS has had these general personnel struggles, its history with highly
qualified IT personnel has been especially problematic. It has succeeded in hiring
high-profile individuals charged with correcting decades of technological mistakes,242 but these individuals tend to be short lived in their positions, and competition over their plans and positions undermines consistent progress.243 Competition
for IT personnel is stiff, especially with the private sectors, and bureaucratic processes often disadvantage the IRS even when compensation and other factors appeal
to potential recruits.244 Turnover of IT personnel also has hampered modernization
efforts.245 A final personnel difficulty is the need for IT personnel to be not only
technically skilled but to understand the peculiarities of both the IRS and the IRS
system. There have been problems with hiring outside experts who did not have the
inside knowledge needed to devise workable technological solutions. 246
Unfortunately for the IRS, cybersecurity experts are both crucial to success and
difficult to recruit. The cybersecurity problem is a cyber “people” problem. Former
Director for Information Assurance at the NSA Richard George says that finding the
people who can respond to growing cyber threats was one of the most worrisome
challenges he faced.247 It is a very small talent pool, and a “lot of people” are trying
to hire from it.248 The “cyberwarfare market has grown so fast that it outstripped
available labor pools.”249 The U.S. government has only three to ten percent of the
cybersecurity experts it needs, and government agencies are disadvantaged in the
competition for this talent.250 The agencies cannot compete in terms of compensation
offered in the private sector. 251 Perhaps just as importantly, the work culture of government agencies is not as appealing as dynamic, high-tech firms where employees
prefer “cargo shorts and a T-shirt over khakis and a tie.”252 While these problems are
common to government agencies, the IRS is even worse off, struggling with limited
resources, low office morale, and arguably less mission appeal than, say, the NSA,
the Pentagon, or the White House.

/news/features/2015-04-08/an-emotional-audit-irs-workers-are-miserable-and-overwhelmed
[https://perma.cc/ZKE8-GJLP].
240. See Hoffman, supra note 239, at 33.
241. Guttman, supra note 181, at 727.
242. Id.
243. See id.
244. See Noble, supra note 178.
245. See Guttman, supra note 181, at 727.
246. See Noble, supra note 178.
247. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 235–36.
248. Id. at 236.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id. at 236–37.
252. Id. at 237.
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D. Too Many Users
A fourth reason to doubt the IRS’s ability to master cybersecurity is recognizing
the greatest weakness in cybersecurity: human users. The greatest leak of top U.S.
secrets was not a great technical feat; rather, it was a single individual’s politically
motivated choice to download and disclose documents. 253 One of the largest cyber
breaches in U.S. military history occurred when a U.S. soldier picked up a flash drive
in a parking lot near his base and plugged it into his computer to see what was on
it.254 What was on the flash drive was a worm devised by a foreign intelligence
agency to attack the military computer system and that took the Pentagon more than
a year to clean out of its systems.255 The tactic of relying on authorized users plugging
infected drives into protected systems is so well known it has its own name: “candy
drop.”256 It is not just soldiers who take this infectious candy from strangers. An
executive at an IT company did the same with a malware-ridden CD that had been
left in his company’s restroom. 257 It’s not just candy that tempts humans, of course.
A defense company employee used his business computer to share music online,
allowing Iranian hackers to access design details for the U.S. President’s helicopters.258 In one high profile “spear phishing”259 attack, British military officers’ systems were hacked because the officers responded to a faked “friend request” from a
well-known British admiral.260 Such poor cybersecurity hygiene is ubiquitous. It accounts for the most common computer password being “password,” and the second
most common being “123456.”261 In one very disturbing case, password laziness was
taken to near its limit by a U.S. Air Force base commander who insisted on being
given a single-digit password to access classified information because he was “too
important” to type in multiple digits. 262 In another disturbing case, a Secretary of
State, responsible for the international relationships of the United States with all
other nations, sidestepped all protocols for e-mail usage, storing her e-mail on a
private server at her house, violating general government policies, and ignoring

253. Strohm & Wilber, supra note 127.
254. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 64–65.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 64.
257. Id. at 65.
258. Id.
259. “Phishing” is a familiar type of attack. It is a “digital form of social engineering that uses
authentic-looking, but fake, e-mails to request information from users or direct them to a fake
website that requests information.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 138, at 5.
If a specific individual or group is targeted, it is called “spear phishing.” For example, rather than
receiving a phishing e-mail from a Nigerian prince, the user receives one from his mother, wife,
or friend. Id. The specific information used for spear phishing, whether it is the e-mail addresses
of military officers or the name of a user’s mother, wife, or friend, often are obtained by simple
word searches of widely accessible information. As it turns out, the “most impressive tool in the
attackers’ arsenal is Google.” SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 57.
260. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 58.
261. Id. at 241.
262. Id. at 242.
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specific advice to her personally.263 In another disturbing case directly on point, IRS
employees sidestepped protocols for e-mail, sending unencrypted email that may
have exposed the personal information of twenty-eight million taxpayers. 264 While
there are many technical difficulties that make our defense difficult, it is the human
activity that makes us most vulnerable.
Notably, not even the military has been able to manage the human elements in its
systems. The IRS is even less likely able to manage them. First, the IRS already
suffers significant personnel problems: low morale and difficulty retaining its more
experienced employees. Second, unlike the military systems that are not accessible
by the public, the IRS system is. No matter how problematic employees may be in
terms of cybersecurity hygiene, the IRS system involves hundreds of millions of
nonemployee users. There are hundreds of millions of taxpayers, third-party reporters, and tax professionals providing and seeking taxpayer information. The evidence
is clear that very few individuals appreciate cybersecurity risks: we do not read the
terms of service; we upload and download what we should not; and we make ourselves vulnerable through poor passwords, public posting of private information,
and, in general, not taking cyber risks seriously.265 It is extraordinarily unlikely that
the IRS will be able to implement a security system that covers hundreds of millions
of users providing and receiving private information while following appropriate
protocols.
E. Cybersecurity Is Difficult
A final reason to predict the IRS will be unable to master cybersecurity is simply
that cybersecurity is very difficult. The U.S. government has been focused on
cybersecurity since 1997,266 yet its failings are headline news: personnel records on

263. See Mark Landler & Eric Lichtblau, F.B.I. Director James Comey Recommends No
Charges for Hillary Clinton on Email, N.Y. TIMES (July 5, 2016), http://nyti.ms/29k3gCm
[https://perma.cc/R889-NZN9].
264. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2017-30-010, EMPLOYEES
SOMETIMES DID NOT ADHERE TO E-MAIL POLICIES WHICH INCREASED THE RISK OF IMPROPER
DISCLOSURE OF TAXPAYER INFORMATION 4 (2016), https://www.treasury.gov/tigta
/auditreports/2017reports/201730010fr.pdf [https://perma.cc/29NF-8KFL].
265. SINGER & FRIEDMAN, supra note 112, at 241; Allison S. Brehm & Cathy D. Lee, Click
Here To Accept the Terms of Service, 31 ABA COMM. LAW. 1 (2015), https://
www.americanbar.org/publications/communications_lawyer/2015/january/click_here.html
[https://perma.cc/WF3S-FWRC]; Troy Hunt, The Science of Password Selection, TROY HUNT
(July 18, 2011), https://www.troyhunt.com/science-of-password-selection [https://perma.cc
/Y9HT-WNQP]; Aaron Smith, Half of Online Americans Don’t Know What a Privacy
Policy Is, P EW RES. CTR. (Dec. 4, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12
/04/half-of-americans-dont-know-what-a-privacy-policy-is [https://perma.cc/4HZ4-FZPL];
Shankar Vedantam, Do You Read Terms of Service Contracts? Not Many Do, Research
Shows, NPR (Aug. 23, 2016, 5:06 AM), http://www.npr.org/2016/08/23/491024846/do-youread-terms-of-service-contracts-not-many-do-research-shows [https://perma.cc/LX48-MT7V].
266. In 1997, the Government Accountability Office first designated cybersecurity as a
“government-wide high-risk area.” U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-16-294,
INFORMATION SECURITY: DHS NEEDS TO ENHANCE CAPABILITIES, IMPROVE PLANNING, AND
SUPPORT GREATER ADOPTION OF ITS NATIONAL CYBERSECURITY PROTECTION SYSTEM 1
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twenty-five million individuals stolen from OPM;267 Edward Snowden stealing more
top secrets than had ever been stolen;268 and successful cyberattacks against the
White House, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense, Department of State,
Postal Service, National Aeronautical Space Agency, United States Geological
Service, and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory.269 And, of course, corporations are
focused on cybersecurity, but their failures too are headline news: personal information from 83 million JPMorgan Chase account holders stolen, personal information from 56 million Home Depot customers and 110 million Target customers,
and health insurance information from Anthem on 80 million Americans. 270 There is
no reason to believe that the IRS will be able to succeed where so many agencies and
corporations have failed, especially given that the treasure trove of information that
the IRS likely will be storing in the future is far more valuable information than credit
card numbers.
Cybersecurity is a very difficult goal to achieve, which is why, despite the efforts
of agencies and corporations, there continue to be huge failures. Cybersecurity “is
harder than building bridges . . . . [p]rotecting the Internet and online computerized
systems from attack is a difficult, messy problem.” 271 In addition to the difficulties
raised by a shortage of qualified IT experts, the tremendous problems caused by
widespread human negligence, and the difficulties of a system being used by hundreds of millions, there are other factors that make cybersecurity so difficult—not
just for the IRS but any organization. First, cyber systems are extraordinarily complex.272 Windows 10 uses 50 million lines of code, and Mac OS 10.04 uses 86 million.273 Each line potentially contains errors to be exploited. These systems are being
upgraded, revised to be improved, but with each revision potentially bringing new
vulnerabilities.274 Second, cyberattacks have high reward potential and low costs and
risks.275 Cyberspace has valuable targets, which can be hit—their data to be stolen,
sold, and used in further attacks—for financial or political purposes.276 And
cyberattacks are “relatively cheap, easy to conduct, and of low risk to their
perpetrators,”277 who may be in foreign countries thousands of miles away. Third,
security measures that protect access to a system (such as a password) do not provide
protection for “data in transit over networks.”278 Protecting this data requires

(2016). Each year since 2001, Congress has held cybersecurity-related hearings. RITA TEHAN,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43317, CYBERSECURITY: LEGISLATION, HEARINGS, AND EXECUTIVE
BRANCH DOCUMENTS 1 (2017).
267. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
268. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
269. See Significant Cyber Events, supra note 121.
270. Moisés Naím, Why Cyber War Is Dangerous for Democracies, ATLANTIC (June 25,
2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/06/hackers-cyber-china-russia
/396812 [https://perma.cc/T9PM-EYT9].
271. Denning & Denning, supra note 3, at 154.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 156.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. See id. at 155.
277. Id. at 156.
278. Id. at 155.
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different measures (such as encryption), which raise far more difficult problems to
solve.279
While these are the difficulties for every other organization, the IRS is unlike any
other organization. One of the reasons that its efforts to modernize its technology,
generally, have failed so often is that it is such a complex project. One outside tech
expert who worked on the BSM project said it was the most complex project he had
in his thirty years of high-tech work.280 In addition to the complex technical issues
that have accrued over the past fifty years of patched and piecemeal updates, the
work of the system is inherently complex. This is a system that, whatever its technical
shortcomings, is, in fact, processing more than 243 million returns of various sorts, 281
$3.3 trillion in gross tax payments, and $403 billion of refunds each year.282 While it
may be the IT modernization efforts at the IRS involved the IRS spending billions
order to rebuild a 1960 Chevy, 283 trying to improve IT at the IRS must be akin to
trying to rebuild a car’s engine while driving it. Some sympathy for the IT employees
at the IRS is due. Their failures over the decades to solve the IT problems at the IRS
may well be due more to the difficulty of the problem than lack of skill or effort. But
that makes it even less likely, not more likely, that the IRS will solve the
cybersecurity problems other organizations cannot solve.
III. BETTER DIGITAL TECHNOLOGY IS NOT THE GOAL
The IRS must collect tax information, and it will increasingly use information
technology to increase the tax information it collects. The problem is that the IRS
will use technology to collect far more information than it can protect technologically. One approach would be to slow the use of new digital technology, cautiously
stepping rather than naively running further into the IT revolution. This approach is
considered in Part III.A, though, as a matter of popularity and politics, it is most
likely a nonstarter. Part III.B sketches the ways in which commonly proposed tax
reforms could address the problem. These reforms would increase the security of
information held by the IRS by tasking the IRS with collecting less information, collecting information on fewer individuals, and issuing fewer refunds. Congress reducing these IRS tasks would make the IRS a less appealing and more defensible target
for cyberattack.
A. Slowing the Use of Digital Technology
If the IRS cannot technologically defend the information it collects, what is the
best way forward? One approach would be to more intentionally, more selectively,
and more cautiously employ digital technology in tax administration. This may mean

279. Id.
280. A vice president of CSC, the outside corporation hired to facilitate BSM, described it
as the most complex project he had encountered in his “30 years of working in the technology
field.” Thompson, supra note 180.
281. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 21, at 6.
282. Id. at iii.
283. Guttman, supra note 181, at 726.
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technological “arrest” or “regression,” that is, suspending the use of emerging technology or returning to an earlier technology, as the case may be, out of concerns for
cybersecurity.284 For example, following the revelation of Edward Snowden’s leak
of top U.S. secrets, Russian security officials ordered manual typewriters. 285 Nikolai
Kovalev, a Russian Member of Parliament and former head of the Federal Security
Service, explained that “from the point of view of keeping secrets, the most primitive
method is preferred: a human hand with a pen or a typewriter” because every “form
of electronic communication is vulnerable.”286 There is some expectation that this
type of practice will expand in an effort to protect national security. 287 Some government employees in Germany are being encouraged to “stay away from technology
whenever they can” when it comes to sensitive communications. 288 “Those concerned talk less on the phone, prefer to meet in person. More coffees are being drunk
and lunches eaten together. Even the walk in the park is increasingly enjoying a revival” among these government employees. 289 Presumably, such strategic retreats
from the cutting edge will be the exceptions to the general rule of increasing reliance
on digital technology. However, the exceptions underscore how difficult
cybersecurity is, and that serious consideration of the best way forward does not exaggerate the inadequacies of past ways. The future may be considerably more varied
and complicated in terms of how information technology is used than the carefree
use of the technology by contemporary American consumers suggest.
In the Russian case, the inability of many government agencies to keep pace with
technological innovation has meant that typewriters were not as far from common
use as would be the case in the United States.290 In those situations, it was not intentional technological arrest that may have provided relative cybersecurity benefits, but
rather happenstance. It seems likely that this happened at the IRS, too. The IRS computerized its operations in the mid-1960s, and, as explained above, much of its storing and processing of information still relies on the 1960s design and magnetic
tapes.291 None of this information has been hacked. The cyberattacks against the IRS
have been aimed at only the most recent technological updates that were public facing. The refund attacks took advantage of the electronic filing processes, which were
not fully implemented for more than forty years after the National Computing Center

284. See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Giving Up on Cybersecurity, 64 UCLA L. REV. DIS. 320,
320 (2016) (arguing that the response to increasing digitization will result in disengagement
from high technologies).
285. Id. at 330; Miriam Elder, Russian Guard Service Reverts to Typewriters After NSA
Leaks, GUARDIAN (July 11, 2013), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/11/russiareverts-paper-nsa-leaks [https://perma.cc/5GZY-CGTV].
286. Elder, supra note 285; see also Eichensehr, supra note 284, at 330.
287. Eichensehr, supra note 284, at 331; Elder, supra note 285 (discussing likelihood of
expansion of strategy among G20); Philip Oltermann, Germany ‘May Revert to Typewriters’
To Counter Hi-Tech Espionage, GUARDIAN (July 15, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com
/world/2014/jul/15/germany-typewriters-espionage-nsa-spying-surveillance [https://perma.cc
/CA9A-WHVY] (considering strategy by German government).
288. Oltermann, supra note 287 (considering strategy by German government).
289. Id.
290. See Elder, supra note 285 (listing various agencies unable to update technologically).
291. See supra notes 156–167 and accompanying text.
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was established.292 And the Get Transcript attack was aimed at a technology that was
only months old.293 It is worth noting that the antiquated and piecemeal nature of the
IRS information system may have provided considerable cybersecurity for taxpayer
information. While the failure to modernize the system has become an embarrassment to the agency, its technical director has made clear that the system is “not broken.”294 Indeed, if the Future State initiative emphasis on transforming the publicfacing aspects of the system were shifted to the refund-processing and fraud-detection functions, if more attention were paid to customer service by phone and mail
than through apps and the web, the resulting systems might more adequately serve
and protect taxpayers for some time to come.295 President Obama’s vision of making
taxpaying like online pizza-ordering may be seeing much further in the future than
he thought.296
However, given the political pressure on the IRS to close the tax gap and ease the
compliance burden, and the IRS’s aim to update its information technology fully, it
is almost certainly too late for a strategic retreat from the type of vision articulated
in the Future State initiative. Even if such a retreat would be the best strategy, persuading the public and the politicians and the bureaucrats that what is older may be
better, and, indeed, more cutting-edge than what is newer, is a nonstarter. It is too
simple to be persuasive. There is too much popular faith in IT expertise to convince
either the public or the politicians that we cannot always get the technology we want
and may not even be able to get what we need.
B. Cybersecurity and Tax Reform
If we take as a given that the IRS will increase its use of digital information technology to collect and store information, and that the IRS will not move more cautiously and slowly and counter to the popular imagination, even though its digital
technology will be unable to protect the information it holds, what then? If it is too
heretical to limit technological aspirations, perhaps it is still acceptable to limit information needs. Congress decides what information is tax relevant, and then the IRS
uses computer technology to collect, store, and process the information that Congress
has defined as relevant. I suggest we turn our focus from the technology the IRS is

292. See supra notes 53–61 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 63–65 and accompanying text.
294. See Noble, supra note 178.
295. The National Taxpayer Advocate has criticized the Future State initiative for being
focused on new technology to the exclusion of human needs, preferences, and behavior. The
National Taxpayer Advocate’s 2015 Annual Report to Congress: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Gov’t Operations of the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 114th Cong.
42 (2016) (statement of Nina E. Olson, National Taxpayer Advocate) (Olson believes that
IRS focusing on online accounts is wrong-headed and will not reduce costs or satisfy taxpayers); Bernie Becker, Mapping Out the ‘Future State,’ P OLITICO (Feb. 23, 2016, 10:00
AM),
http://www.politico.com/tipsheets/morning-tax/2016/02/mapping-out-the-futurestate-uncharted-territory-for-tax-analysts-irs-audit-rate-keeps-slipping-212842 [https://perma
.cc/BA2T-FU4G] (“Olson has openly worried that the plan will treat poorer taxpayers as
second-class citizens.”).
296. See Lapowsky, supra note 40.
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using to the information the IRS is being tasked to collect, store, and process with its
technology. My recommendation is this: Congress should make its political compromises on what information is tax relevant in light of the need to protect the information as it is collected and stored and processed.
There is considerable flexibility in tax law. There is no Platonic form of taxation.
While natural law may guide legislation on crime, morality, and war, it is of little use
in deciding whether a universal standard deduction ought to replace itemized deductions. Tax law is always a matter of political compromises and educated guesses.
One approach to improving the cybersecurity of the information collected by the IRS
would be to make those compromises and guesses in ways that reduce information
security risks. The compromises inhere in the tax legislation process in great part
because there is considerable uncertainty and disagreement over fundamental issues,
like whether it is preferable to tax labor, capital, or consumption.297 While these uncertainties and disagreements create flexibility, there is also the flexibility that comes
from multiple ways of achieving the same tax result. If the intended result is to tax
national consumption, it can be done through a national sales tax comparable to the
familiar state sales taxes.298 Or it can be done by keeping the familiar federal income
tax but by deducting savings from income. 299 Between the flexibility of tax theories,
which reveal the numerous roads to the same destination, and the reality of political
compromises on the trip down any of those roads, there is ample room for Congress
to consider information security risks when enacting tax legislation.
The way forward is to ask, what sorts of tax legislation would improve
cybersecurity prospects? Tax legislation is usually assessed on familiar points: revenue, efficiency, equity, administrative ease, and political viability.300 Into this mix of
points, and overlapping all of them though not overriding any of them, information
security should be added. There is a fair supply of tax reform proposals always on
the shelves of Congress, if not on the floor. Given the relative mix of those points of
debate at any given time, some proposals are more appealing and others less. Each
of the proposals has its proponents and opponents, advantages and disadvantages,
uncertainties, unknowns, and politics. The step forward, at this point, is not to argue
for a particular proposal to improve cybersecurity, but rather to argue that
cybersecurity implications ought to be one of the points of argument on all of the
proposals.
What sorts of tax reform would improve cybersecurity prospects? Reform that
would make the IRS a less appealing and a more defensible cyberattack target would.

297. For an overview of the research on various forms of taxation, see David Gamage, The
Case for Taxing (All of) Labor, Income, Consumption, Capital Income, and Wealth, 68 TAX
L. REV. 355 (2015) (arguing that as all forms of tax measurement are imperfect, it is often
better for governments to use multiple forms of tax measurement).
298. See, e.g., David R. Burton & Dan R. Mastromarco, The National Sales Tax: Moving
Beyond the Idea, 71 TAX NOTES 1237 n.32 (1996) (discussing similar system employed in
Quebec to collect both the federal goods and services taxes and the provincial sales tax).
299. See, e.g., Alliance USA, Unlimited Savings Allowance (USA) Tax System, 66 TAX
NOTES 1485 (1995); William D. Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal
Income Tax, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1113 (1974).
300. See, e.g., PHILIP D. OLIVER, TAX POLICY 1–4 (2011) (overview of primary tax policy
criteria).
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Reform that made refunds the exception rather than the rule, making the IRS less like
an ATM would reduce its appeal to financial thieves. Reform that reduced the
amount of information required of taxpayers, and reform that reduces the number of
individuals on whom information is collected would reduce the appeal of the IRS to
information thieves, as well as the appeal to terrorists and hostile governments who
may seek not merely to steal but manipulate or destroy information. These same reforms would make the IRS more likely able to defend itself. Imagine an IRS not
burdened with the need to process hundreds of millions of refund claims and pay
billions of dollars over a short period of time each year. Imagine that same IRS processing fewer individual returns each year and collecting less information on each
return. The IRS would have a greatly reduced need to consume information. It would
be a much skinnier IRS. And, a skinnier IRS would be more easily fitted with digital
protection. With fewer individuals claiming refunds, there would be less pressure to
provide and defend online refund processes. With less information being collected,
there would be less information to process and protect. And with fewer individuals
covered by the system, there would be fewer online users to accommodate and monitor. With less pressure on its information system, there could be more focus on improving the system. As it is, the IRS is overwhelmed with nineteen major technology
projects and unable to make even the simplest of improvements, like upgrading
Windows,301 much less the most complicated of improvements, like providing adequate cybersecurity. Whatever the chances the IRS has for developing an adequate
high-tech response to information security, the odds are greater if both the high-tech
needs of the IRS and the external users of the IRS system are lessened. The IRS will
not be able to secure a system that involves hundreds of millions of individuals reporting and accessing information and claiming and being paid billions in refunds.
The IRS may be able to secure something much less ambitious.
Below are sketches of a half dozen common tax reform proposals, considering the
extent to which each would—relative to the current system—reduce the number of
refunds, require less information, and reduce the number of individuals involved.
The proposals are the Pay-As-You-Earn improvements on the withholding mechanisms; efforts to simplify the income tax, or, to purify the income tax, or to transform
it from a mass tax to an elite one; and proposals to tax consumption rather than income, either in the form of a sales tax that almost all of the states use, or in the form
a value-added tax (VAT) that almost all economically developed nations use. Of
course, the extent to which a proposal would achieve these three recommendations
would depend upon the details of actual legislation, politically pushed and pulled
into place. In their current form, none of these proposals address the impact on
cybersecurity prospects, but looking at some of the key features of the proposals, we
can compare their relative potential to fit with the recommendations.
1. Pay-As-You-Earn (PAYE)
In the current U.S. income tax system, employers withhold from employees’
paychecks and pay the withheld amounts to the IRS throughout the year so the

301. See supra notes 199–209 and accompanying text.
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amounts can be held and used to pay the employee’s year-end income tax liability.302
To the extent these advance payments exceed the employee’s actual tax liability the
employee is entitled to a refund.303 This advance payment system is essential to the
function of the U.S. income tax as, otherwise, employees would have to be sufficiently organized and disciplined to estimate their future tax liabilities and save accordingly.304
Tax systems worldwide use withholding, but the details vary importantly. In the
United States, the system systemically results in overwithholding, which is why the
IRS must refund payments to about 117 million of the 149 million of individual taxpayers.305 The U.S. system works well in the sense of ensuring that the liabilities are
covered. But it does so in a way that then burdens many taxpayers with the need to
file returns to claim refunds and burdens the IRS with the need to process these returns and issue refund payments. The U.S. system uses a simpler, less precise method
than many other countries.306 For example, if the rate of wages changes during the
course of the year, the U.S. system does not adjust the amount of withholding.
However, in the United Kingdom, withholding is adjusted with such precision that
usually the employee’s ultimate tax liability is exactly covered, often through significant adjustments in withholding amounts in the employee’s final paycheck of the
year.307 The same approach is often used for withholding interest and other payments
to the taxpayer by third parties who are not employers.308 A more precise withholding
system—commonly called a pay-as-you-earn (PAYE) system—means not only that
refund payments become the exception rather than the rule but that even individual
tax returns do. In the United Kingdom, this system works so well that most lowerand middle-income taxpayers’ liabilities are precisely satisfied such that they need
not file a return.309 This covers about two-thirds of the taxpayers in the United
Kingdom and about 80% of all wage-earners.310
Movement towards a PAYE system in the United States has been promoted for
years, largely due to the success of such systems outside the United States. However,
moving towards such a system would require significant simplification to the U.S.
tax system with respect to the number of tax rates that apply to income, the impact
of marital or family status on those rates, and the number of deductions and credits

302. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., ANNUAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS VOLUME 2: TAS RESEARCH & RELATED STUDIES 148–49 (2011), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/tas/irs_tas_arc_2011_vol_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/YH2F-6KNG].
303. Id.
304. Robert Higgs, Wartime Origins of Modern Income-Tax Withholding, FREEMAN: IDEAS
ON LIBERTY, Nov. 2007, at 31, 31–32; Jonah Goldberg, Automatic Tax Withholding, AM.
ENTERPRISE INST. (May 2, 2013), https://www.aei.org/publication/automatic-tax-withholding
[https://perma.cc/B4UG-ZFZU].
305. See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., supra note 21.
306. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 302, at 148–49.
307. Id. at 148 n.16; William J. Turnier, PAYE as an Alternative to an Alternative Tax
System, 23 VA. TAX REV. 205, 227 (2003).
308. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 302, at 148–49.
309. Turnier, supra note 307, at 212.
310. Id. at 212, 232.
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available to individuals.311 Without such a simplification, the U.S. tax system would
remain too complex for PAYE to be implemented. As such simplification would inevitably target complex yet important benefits, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit
(EITC), the benefits of a PAYE system would have to be clearly greater than the
benefits of the programs that would be targeted.
As part of counting the costs and benefits of a PAYE system in the United States,
we should consider the impact it would have on cybersecurity. In terms of improving
information security, the chief benefit of a PAYE system would be reforming the
refund system in the United States. To the extent refunds became the exception rather
than the rule, the refund payment process could be more tightly controlled, reducing
the ease with which fraudulently filed returns succeed at stealing refund payments.
Having made it a more difficult fraud, stealing taxpayer information to file fraudulent
returns would be a less appealing objective than it currently is. In and of itself, a
PAYE system would not have any impact on the other recommendations, that is,
collecting less information and reducing the number of individuals covered by the
system. However, to the extent that a PAYE system could not be implemented without significant simplification of the substantive tax law, the simplification and PAYE
implementation, together, might also result in less information being collected on
fewer individuals being covered by the system.
2. Simplified Income Tax
The income tax law is often criticized for being too complex. 312 The provisions
that apply to individuals are numerous, technical, and related. For example, by the
National Taxpayer Advocate’s count, there are eleven different provisions related to
college education expenses, each of which has its own eligibility requirements, definitions, income thresholds, phaseouts, and inflation adjustments. 313 There are sixteen different provisions for retirement savings. 314 With over 3.7 million words, the
tax code has three times the words it did in 1975.315 The tax regulations and the summaries of case law and IRS guidance take nine feet of shelf space.316 The income tax
law for individuals is so complex that eighty percent pay for help in preparing their
annual income tax returns.317

311. Id. at 249–50.
312. See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL
STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT
TO SECTION 8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Comm. Print 2001); BORIS
I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES & GIFTS ¶ 3.8
(2017); Joseph M. Dodge, Some Income Tax Simplification Proposals, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
71 (2013); Press Release, U.S. Treasury Department, Treasury Statement on the Joint
Committee on Taxation Study on Tax Simplification (Apr. 25, 2001), https://www.treasury
.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/po223.aspx [https://perma.cc/J78N-HRTF].
313. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 83, at 5.
314. Id. at 6.
315. Id. at 4.
316. Id.
317. Id. at 5.
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The standard deduction and personal and dependency exemptions are among the
simplest of tax provisions. The standard deduction allows a taxpayer to deduct a certain amount regardless of expenses.318 It is based on nothing more than the taxpayer’s
filing status.319 The standard deduction is taken in lieu of the itemized deductions. 320
Similarly, the personal and dependency exemptions allow a taxpayer to exempt a
certain dollar amount from taxation based on the number of individuals in the household.321 Together, these simplify compliance for taxpayers and also shield a basic
subsistence level of income from taxation altogether.322 In practice, over sixty percent of taxpayers claim only the standard deduction and exemptions.323
It is common for tax simplification proposals to aim at increasing the amount of
tax-free income to which a taxpayer is entitled each year while decreasing the number of specific tax benefits available. For example, the bipartisan National
Commission on Fiscal Responsibility and Reform (often called the “SimpsonBowles Commission”) proposed eliminating all (nonbusiness or investment-related)
itemized deductions and retaining only a standard deduction.324 Increasing the standard deduction and exemption amounts, even if not completely eliminating all other
tax benefits for individuals, has also been proposed by others, such as Senator Rand
Paul.325 Professor Michael Graetz has proposed a “family allowance” of $100,000 to
replace not only itemized deductions but the standard deduction and the exemptions

318. For a general discussion of the standard deduction and its history, see BITTKER &
LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 30.5.
319. In 2016, the standard deduction amounts were $12,600 for married filing jointly,
$9300 for head of household, and $6300 for single or married filing separately. Rev. Proc.
2015-53, 2015-44 I.R.B. 615. There is an additional standard deduction if the taxpayer is over
age 65 or blind. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 30.5.
320. An individual taxpayer takes either (1) the standard deduction, see I.R.C. § 63(c)
(Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-97), or (2) the total of allowable itemized deductions, but not
both, id. § 63(b). “Itemized deductions” are the deductions other than (1) the standard deduction, (2) deductions listed in § 62 that are taken in arriving at adjusted gross income, and (3)
the deductions for personal and dependency exemptions allowed by § 151. Id. § 63(d).
321. In 2016, the personal exemption amount are $4050. Rev. Proc. 2015-53, 2015-44
I.R.B. 615. For a general discussion of the personal and dependency exemptions and their
histories, see BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 30.2–30.3.
322. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 30.5. While discussion of these provisions often conflates these justifications, the two different functions of these provisions might be better
served by focusing on which is most important. See Dodge, supra note 312, at 78 (calling for
the elimination of the standard deduction and the increasing of the personal exemption in order
to protect a subsistence level of income from taxation).
323. In 2014, 43,965,083 returns elected to itemize, whereas 102,594,719 took the standard
deduction. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., PUB. 1304, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS 2014, at
46 (complete report).
324. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, THE MOMENT OF TRUTH 31
(2010), http://momentoftruthproject.org/sites/default/files/TheMomentofTruth12_1_2010.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F22Y-BPQU].
325. For example, see Rand Paul’s “Fair and Flat Tax Plan.” Rand Paul, Opinion, Blow Up
the Tax Code and Start Over, WALL ST. J. (Jun. 17, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/blowup-the-tax-code-and-start-over-1434582592 [https://perma.cc/X4A5-DQGE]; Senator Rand
Paul Releases Flat Tax Plan, COMMITTEE FOR RESPONSIBLE FED. BUDGET (Nov. 16, 2015)
http://crfb.org/blogs/senator-rand-paul-releases-flat-tax-plan-0 [https://perma.cc/XW3B-2Y4F].
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with a simpler though similar mechanism. 326 Professor Edward Kleinbard has suggested replacing all itemized deductions with a uniform tax credit.327
The opposition to these types of simplification proposals is defense of the more
precisely targeted tax benefits that come with itemized deductions. For example, the
long-standing policy of encouraging deductions to charities through the charitable
income tax deduction, subsidizing medical care through the medical expense deduction, and promoting home ownership through home mortgage interest deduction are
accomplished through itemized deductions.328 The complexity of these and similar
tax benefits are arguably justified by the advantages obtained for fairness or other
important policies, such as stimulating the economy. 329
Alongside the advantages and disadvantages of simplifying the tax system this
way, we also should consider the cybersecurity advantages. With respect to the recommendations for improving cybersecurity, simplification like providing a more
generous standard deduction and exemptions in lieu of more specific tax benefits
would succeed in reducing the amount of information required. In and of itself, such
a move would not affect the number of refunds paid or the number of individuals
covered by the system. Of course, if coupled with movement towards implementing
a PAYE system, the number of refunds would be reduced. The most important independent benefit for improving information security prospects would be to reduce the
amount of information collected. Depending upon the form of the simplification, the
amount of information would reflect nothing more than the number of individuals
with some specified relationship with the taxpayer. What would be eliminated would
be requirements to provide more detailed information, such as the medical care, child
care, and education expenses for those individuals,330 or any of the other information
required by the deductions and credits eliminated by the proposal.
3. Purified Income Tax
Somewhat similarly to criticisms of the complexity of the tax law is the criticism
that the tax law is not focused on revenue collection. Beginning with Professor
Stanley Surrey, the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Tax Policy under President

326. This is part of a much more fundamental reform described below. Michael J. Graetz,
100 Million Unnecessary Returns: A Fresh Start for the U.S. Tax System, 112 YALE L.J. 261,
295 (2002) (arguing for the imposition of a VAT and elite income tax).
327. EDWARD D. KLEINBARD, WE ARE BETTER THAN THIS: HOW GOVERNMENT SHOULD
SPEND OUR MONEY 382 (2015) (proposing the replacing of all personal itemized deductions
with a fifteen percent credit).
328. For a discussion of the role of itemized deductions and the standard deduction, see
BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 30.4–30.5.
329. For an overview of the defense of this type of complexity, see id. ¶ 3.8. More specifically, see Samuel A. Donaldson, The Easy Case Against Tax Simplification, 22 VA. TAX REV.
645 (2003) (arguing that complexity in the tax code is a net benefit in achieving policy objectives, and that tax simplification proposals are an overcorrection to the problem and ultimately
ineffectual).
330. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 213 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-97) (medical expense deduction); id. § 21 (dependent care credit); id. § 25A (education credits); id. § 222 (deduction for
education expenses). See generally Hatfield, supra note 77.
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Kennedy, many critics have conceived the tax code as two independent parts. 331 The
first part is what is necessary to implement the income tax.332 The second part is
“grafted on to the structure of the income tax.” 333 It is a “vast subsidy apparatus that
uses the mechanics of the income tax as the method paying the subsidies” by providing “exclusions from income, exemptions, deductions, credits against tax, preferential rates of tax, and deferrals of tax.”334 Although grafted into the income tax, these
“tax expenditures” are the equivalent of a subsidy payment. Critics of tax expenditures equate the choice not to tax what should be taxed with a payment to the benefitted taxpayer. As a result of Professor Surrey’s conception, each year the President
and the Joint Committee on Taxation each prepare a list of these potentially controversial benefits.335 These two lists—known as the “tax expenditure budgets”—differ
in the some of the technical definitions, but the resulting lists are quite similar.336 The
most significant tax expenditure items are those related to employer-provided benefits (i.e., the tax advantages of employer-provided health care and retirement plans),
the lower tax rates and other benefits for capital gains (e.g., stepped-up basis at
death), the deductibility of home mortgage interest, and three benefits targeted at
those with lower incomes: the EITC, the child credit, and the credit for health insurance covered provided by the Affordable Care Act (ACA). 337 The significance of
many of these items, especially these latter ones, has prompted the National Taxpayer
Advocate to propose the IRS change its mission statement to reflect that it is not so

331. STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM 6 (1973).
332. Id.
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. Tax incentives cover a wide array of economic activities. The Joint Committee on
Taxation identifies the following tax expenditure budget groups: national defense; international affairs; general science, space, and technology; energy; natural resources and environment; agriculture; commerce and housing; financial institutions; transportation; community
and regional development; education, training, employment, and social services; health and
income security; social security and railroad retirement; veterans’ benefits and services; and
general purpose fiscal assistance. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 114TH CONG., ESTIMATES
OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2015–2019, at 28–42 (2015),
https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown&id=4857
[https://perma.cc/93BQP22E]; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 2016 BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT
119–24 (2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/budget/fy2016/assets
/budget.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JPY-ALBU]; see also William McBride, A Brief History of Tax
Expenditures, TAX FOUND. (2013), https://files.taxfoundation.org/legacy/docs/ff391.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XW6H-N9N2].
336. First, there are different baselines for what constitutes a tax expenditure; some use the
deviation from a normal tax, or a tax based on the Haig-Simons definition of income, whereas
another approach is the reference tax law method, which analyzes deviations from the general
rules of a tax law system. BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 3.6. Second, a tax expenditure
budget can look to revenue loss, to estimates of correspondence expenditures to duplicate the
tax benefit, and time value of money losses from deferral of tax items. Id. Finally, tax expenditure budgets differ in their categorization of expenses. Compare OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
supra note 335, with JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 335.
337. See the Tax Policy Center’s assessment of 2016 tax expenditure items. TAX POLICY
CTR., BRIEFING BOOK, http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-largest-taxexpenditures [https://perma.cc/AT79-BAYE].
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much a tax collection agency as a social service agency.338 Indeed, a recent study of
the publication of new Treasury Regulations suggests that at least half, if not more
than half, of what the IRS is concerned with these days is not related to tax collection.339
Purifying the income tax of tax expenditures and focusing the IRS on tax collection is a common call among tax reformers. For example, the Simpson-Bowles
Commission recommended the elimination of all tax expenditure items except a few,
such as those for employer-provided retirement benefits. 340 The National Taxpayer
Advocate has suggested the presumption should be against tax expenditures, with
rebuttal only if a “compelling business case can be made that the benefits of providing the tax incentive through the tax code outweigh the tax-complexity challenges.”341 The National Taxpayer Advocate has said “that the fundamental design
question is whether a program would be better suited to the tax system or to a pure
spending program,” especially when the program is outside the revenue collection
competence of the IRS.342 Here specifically is concern for the antipoverty benefits
that are clearly more social service-oriented than tax collector-oriented. With respect
to the largest of these benefits, the EITC, Professor Michael Graetz has suggested it
would be improved considerably by changing it from a refundable income tax credit
to a payroll tax adjustment.343
There are also those who defend tax expenditures. Among academics, there has
long been resistance to the claim that the tax law can be clearly divided between the
“normal” taxing part and the suspicious “expenditure part.” 344 Among politicians,
there has long been recognition that some tax expenditures are so popular, that no
one should suggest their elimination. For example, even the Simpson-Bowles
Commission defended employer-provided retirement benefits. It is not only political
popularity that protects at least some tax expenditures but also political consensus
that one of the most significant antipoverty expenditures, the EITC, works well. 345

338. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 4, https://
www.irs.gov/pub/tas/execsummary_2010arc.pdf [https://perma.cc/RZW5-DADE].
339. See Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717,
1749 (2014) (arguing the administrative functions of the IRS have transformed to program
administration as opposed to revenue raising).
340. NAT’L COMM’N ON FISCAL RESPONSIBILITY & REFORM, supra note 324, at 31 n.6.
341. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 338, at 29.
342. Id. at 54.
343. Graetz, supra note 326, at 291–93.
344. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 3.6; Boris I. Bittker, Accounting for Federal
“Tax Subsidies” in the National Budget, 22 NAT’L TAX J. 244 (1969); Douglas A. Kahn & Jeffrey
S. Lehman, Tax Expenditure Budgets: A Critical View, 54 TAX NOTES 1661 (1992).
345. Peter A. Muennig, Babak Mohit, Jinjing Wu, Haomiao Jia & Zohn Rosen, Cost
Effectiveness of the Earned Income Tax Credit as a Health Policy Investment, 51 AM. J.
PREVENTATIVE MED. 874 (2016), http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0749379
716302495 [https://perma.cc/2FP6-XZBS]; Chuck Marr, Chye-Ching Huang, Arloc
Sherman & Brandon DeBot, EITC and Child Tax Credit Promote Work, Reduce Poverty,
and Support Children’s Development, Research Finds, CTR. ON BUDGET & POL’Y
PRIORITIES (Oct. 1, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/research/federal-tax/eitc-and-child-taxcredit-promote-work-reduce-poverty-and-support-childrens [https://perma.cc/3944-9875];
Earned Income Tax Credit Program Is a Boon for Health, Report Suggests, SCIENCEDAILY
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Into this mix of considering the appropriate role of tax expenditures needs to be
their relationship to cybersecurity. With respect to the information security recommendations described above, purifying the income tax of tax expenditures would
succeed in reducing the amount of information required simply by reducing the number of benefits for which information is relevant. The effect would be similar to replacing itemized deductions with a standard deduction. However, unlike merely simplifying the income tax that way, eliminating all tax expenditures would also reduce
the number of refunds paid and the number of individuals filing returns. Of the most
significant tax expenditures are three administered as refunds: the EITC, the child
care credit, and the ACA credit for health insurance coverage provided. The total
“refunds” paid for these programs amounts to $134.4 billion.346 As entitlement to
these payments is not conditioned on tax liability, many individuals who file a tax
return to claim one of these payments otherwise would not be filing a return.347 Thus,
the elimination of tax expenditures would contribute to improving the cybersecurity
prospects of tax information by reducing the amount of information collected by the
IRS, reducing the number of refunds paid by the IRS, and reducing the numbers of
individuals filing returns.
4. Elite Income Tax
The individual income tax is a progressive tax. 348 By design, as one’s income increases one’s tax rate increases. In the past few years, some journalists have focused
on reporting on circumstances in which the theoretical progressivity fails, and taxpayers with lower incomes have their income taxed at higher rates.349 These circumstances are not surprising to tax experts, who understand progressivity as a general

(Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2016/09/160907095442.htm [https://
perma.cc/E8GG-VGJJ].
346. Payments of the EITC totaled $68.34 billion and were claimed on 28,537,908 returns.
Credits of the Child Tax Credit totaled $27.20 billion and were claimed on 22,394,927 returns.
Refundable payments of the Additional Child Tax Credit totaled $27.06 billion and were
20,225,421 returns. Payments of the Premium Tax Credit totaled $11.18 billion and were
claimed on returns 113,468,824 (111,969,378 returns had a net premium tax credit payment,
where net premium tax credits were claimed on 1,499,446 returns). INTERNAL REVENUE SERV.,
PUB. 4801, INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS, LINE ITEM ESTIMATES, 2014, https://
www.irs.gov/uac/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-line-item-estimates [https://perma
.cc/AKK9-QPCC].
347. In 2014, 24,644,1999 returns claimed the refundable portion of the earned income tax
credit, meaning the tax liability was offset by withholding and other credits; 19,482,011 returns claimed the refundable portion of the child tax credit. Table 3.3 All Returns: Tax
Liability, Tax Credits, and Tax Payments, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2014
(Filing Year 2015), INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-statsindividual-statistical-tables-by-size-of-adjusted-gross-income [https://perma.cc/AY7Z-JRNF].
348. See I.R.C. § 1 (West 2014); see also BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶ 3.6.
349. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Report: Quarter of Millionaires Pay Lower Tax Rate
than Some in Middle Class, WASH. POST (Oct. 12, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/business/economy/report-one-in-four-millionaires-pays-less-in-taxes-than-the-middle-class
/2011/10/12/gIQAh8XNfL_story.html [https://perma.cc/DF2R-7MTK]; Greg Sargent,
Opinion, Yup, the Buffett-and-His-Secretary Analogy Is Completely Accurate, WASH. POST
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rule and tax rates variable on income source as an exception. 350 However, as a matter
of politics, the call to ensure progressivity in fact and not just theory is one that has
gained traction.351
It is one matter to push for ensuring progressivity, but a different one to push for
increasing progressivity. It is one argument that progressivity requires Warren
Buffett to pay tax at a higher rate than his secretary. 352 It is another argument that
Warren Buffett’s tax rate ought to be much, much higher than his secretary’s. There
is increasing popular interest in the income and wealth inequality in the United
States, and that has led to calls for increasing the tax rates on those with the highest
levels of income and wealth.353 Taken to its extreme, this would be a call for imposing an income tax only on those with the highest levels of income.
Pushing progressivity to the point that the income tax was only a tax on those with
the highest levels of income would be returning the income tax to its earliest form.
For about the first quarter of the century of the income tax’s history, it was an elite
tax.354 It was imposed on only about two percent of American households.355 The
income tax was transformed into a mass tax as a result of the decision to pay for
World War II with increased tax revenue. 356 An elite income tax simply did not generate the revenue needed. However, at the time, it was not a foregone conclusion that
the additional revenue would be collected by expanding the income tax. Indeed, for
quite some while, the congressional preference was to keep the income tax as an elite
tax and increase federal revenue with a federal sales tax. 357 President Roosevelt,

(Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/plum-line/post/yup-the-buffett-andhis-secretary-analogy-is-completely-accurate/2011/10/13/gIQAj3NYhL_blog.html [https://
perma.cc/CF9A-BYFT].
350. See BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra note 312, ¶¶ 2.2, 46.2.3.
351. Bernie Sanders on Tax Reform, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/2016
/Bernie_Sanders_Tax_Reform.htm [https://perma.cc/P7DY-6W3B].
352. Warren E. Buffett, Opinion, Stop Coddling the Super-Rich, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 14,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/15/opinion/stop-coddling-the-super-rich.html [https://
perma.cc/9MFL-KU44]; Angie Drobnic Holan, Does a Secretary Pay Higher Taxes than a
Millionaire?, POLITIFACT (Sept. 21, 2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-ometer/article/2011/sep/21/does-secretary-pay-higher-taxes-millionaire [https://perma.cc/C6LH757K]; Chris Isidore, Buffett Says He’s Still Paying Lower Tax Rate than His Secretary, CNN
MONEY (Mar. 4, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/03/04/news/economy/buffettsecretary-taxes [https://perma.cc/GK7R-7D9R]; Rachel Tiede, Clinton Correct Buffett
Claimed To Pay a Lower Tax Rate than His Secretary, POLITIFACT (Oct. 18, 2016, 4:52
PM), http://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2016/oct/18/hillary-clinton/clintoncorrect-buffett-claimed-pay-lower-tax-rate [https://perma.cc/8JPT-RKGK].
353. Lawrence Summers, Opinion, Larry Summers: Changing the Tax Code Could Help
Curb Inequality, WASH. POST (Feb. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions
/larry-summers-changing-the-tax-code-could-help-curb-inequality/2014/02/16/9e9c736e-959511e3-afce-3e7c922ef31e_story.html [https://perma.cc/KS8Y-6NF2].
354. BROWNLEE, supra note 154, at 57.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 115–19.
357. See Lawrence A. Zelenak, The Federal Retail Sales Tax That Wasn’t: An Actual
History and an Alternate History, 73 L. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 205 (2010) (detailing
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however, insisted on expanding the income tax to a mass tax, and this was made
practical by the introduction of withholding from wages on the mass of new
taxpayers.358
Any push to transform the income tax into an elite tax runs into the reality that
such a tax is an insufficient revenue source. It is not feasible to gather the revenue
needed from the highest income individuals. However, at least one recent proposal
echoes the initial congressional approach during World War II. Professor Michael
Graetz has proposed aiming the income tax only on the elites, but supplementing the
income tax with a consumption tax.359 Under his proposal, no family with an income
less than $100,000 would be taxed on the income. 360 Those making over the exempted amount would be pay under a scheme comparable to the current alternative
minimum tax, meaning their tax liability would be determined with a reduced number of deductions.361
Any debate over an elite income tax should be enlarged to include discussion of
its cybersecurity impact. In terms of improving information security, the chief benefit
of transforming the income tax into a tax only on the elite would be reducing the
number of individuals covered. Professor Graetz estimates his proposal would eliminate 100 million individual filers from the system. 362 Whether or not the taxable elite
would report less information under the current income tax would depend on the
details of the new tax structure. For example, if the new tax were similar to the one
envisioned by Professor Graetz, less information would be collected as there would
be fewer deductions available. Of course, the number of refunds would be reduced
as a matter of reducing the number of taxpayers.
5. Federal Sales Tax
Americans are familiar with the retail sales taxes most states impose. 363 A sales
tax may be construed as a tax on the retailer for the privilege of engaging in the retail
sales business or as a tax on the retail buyer.364 Either way, even though it is the buyer
who bears the economic burden of the tax, the retailer is the one responsible to collect

the history of the Roosevelt administration’s rejection of a federal sales tax and the long-term
impact of the choice to solely implement an income tax).
358. Id. at 149–53.
359. Graetz, supra note 326, at 295–97.
360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Id.
363. See CHARLES A. TROST, FEDERAL LIMITATIONS ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX § 11:1 (2d
ed. 2016) (forty-five states and the District of Columbia).
364. ALL STATES TAX GUIDE, P 5071 (2017), https://1.next.westlaw.com/Document
/I5eea8c5eb33d11de9b8c850332338889/View/FullText.html?transitionType=Default&conte
xtData=(sc.Default). The use tax is a complement to the sales tax. It is imposed on the use,
storage, withdrawal, or consumption of tangible personal property within the jurisdiction,
though it is not levied on goods on which the sales tax has been paid. As a result, it primarily
applies on goods purchased outside the taxing jurisdiction. It allows the taxing authority to tax
the use of the goods even though the authority would not have the constitutional authority to
impose a tax on the transportation of the goods from another state. TROST, supra note 363, § 11:1.
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the tax due on the sale and pay it to the state.365 The tax is imposed on the sales price
of tangible personal property, usually at a flat rate. 366 Usually, retailers must file returns and pay the tax on a monthly or quarterly basis, though retailers with low tax
receipts may file less frequently, while other retailers may provide estimated tax reports and payments. Unlike retail buyers, wholesale buyers (i.e., those buying for
resale) are exempt from paying tax on their purchasers. 367 Most states also exempt
“purchases made by nonprofit charitable, educational, and religious organizations,”368 as well as a variety of other retail buyers, such as federal and state government agencies and instrumentalities.369 It is also common for states to exempt certain
sales from the tax, such as drugs, medical supplies, and food.370
Historically, and even to this day, the federal government does impose taxes on
the sales of certain items, such as alcohol, tobacco products, and fuel-inefficient
cars.371 However, the federal government has never imposed a general sales tax. The
widespread use of sales taxes by the states was in response to fiscal emergencies of
the states during the Great Depression of the 1930s. 372 As mentioned above,
Congress did seriously consider a national sales tax in the 1940s, which would have
been imposed in lieu of transforming the income tax from an elite tax to a mass tax,
but President Roosevelt persuaded Congress to transform the income tax instead. 373
Over the past two decades, there has been a consistent but unsuccessful effort to
replace that income tax with a national sales tax. In 1996, a House bill was introduced
to implement a fifteen percent sales tax on most goods and services, but with an
annual rebate to all wage earners based on the sales tax rate applied to the national
poverty level and delivered through reduced withholding in order to ensure
progressivity.374 Following a Canadian model, it was intended to be administered

365. ALL STATES TAX GUIDE, supra note 364, at P 5068, 5071. Even though in some sense
the buyer is the taxpayer, the retailer—as the one held responsible—is the only one entitled to
bring legal claims against the state regarding the tax.
366. Id. at P 5375, 5225, 5465.
367. Id. at P 5074.
368. Id. at P 5111.
369. Id. at P 5090.
370. Id. at P 5315 (exemption for drugs and medical supplies); id. at P 5320 (exemption
for food sold for human consumption off-premises).
371. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 5001, 5041, 5051 (Westlaw through Pub. L. 115-97) (imposition
of excise taxes on production and importation of distilled spirits, wine, and beer
respectively); id. § 5701 (imposition of excise tax on the production or importation of
tobacco products); id. § 4121 (imposition of excise tax on coal manufacture); id. § 4081
(imposition of various excise taxes on gasoline); id. § 4064 (imposition of excise tax on the
manufacture of “gas guzzlers”). In 2009, the total of federal excise taxes amounted to $66
billion. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES: 2010,
at 308 tbl.463 (129th ed. 2009).
372. TROST, supra note 363.
373. See Zelenak, supra note 357, at 149–50.
374. H.R. 3039, 104th Cong. (1996) (sponsored by Representatives Dan Schaefer, Dick
Chrysler, and Billy Tauzin); id. § 1 (tax of fifteen percent on most goods and services); id. §
15(c) (rebate to families based on poverty level). See generally Burton & Mastromarco, supra
note 298.
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primarily by the states collecting the tax and paying it to the federal government. 375
In 1999, a similar proposal was introduced in both the House and the Senate, giving
the movement the proposal’s name: the “Fair Tax.” 376 The current Fair Tax
proposal generally follows the 1996 approach but would apply a much higher
rate.377 While the proposal has been popularized especially among Republicans in
the Southeast, its popularity has not spread. 378 Critics doubt it would generate
sufficient tax revenue, especially given the potential for evasion with retailers
responsible for reporting, collecting, and remitting such a tremendous amount. 379
Arguing over the appropriate role of sales tax in federal revenue should include
arguments over its potential to improve cybersecurity. Whatever its other
shortcomings, a national sales tax similar to the Fair Tax proposal would succeed
on the three recommendations for improving cybersecurity. First, refunds as known
in the current income tax system would be eliminated. Second, the amount of information collected would be minimal. The only relevant information would be the
amount of the sale and whether or not it was taxable or exempt. Third, the number
of individuals covered by the system would be minimized. Only retailers would
file returns, though wage-earners would provide household information relevant to
determining the amount of the annual rebate.
6. Value-Added Tax (VAT)
Although economically equivalent to a sales tax in how the tax is borne, a valueadded tax (VAT) is administratively quite different. Unlike a sales tax, in which
all of the tax due is collected at a single moment—that is, the moment of the sale
—a VAT collects incrementally. It is this incremental collection that makes it

375. H.R. 3039 §§ 31(e)(2), 33; see also Burton & Mastromarco, supra note 298, at 1241
n.32 (discussing similar system employed in Quebec to collect both the federal goods and
services taxes and the provincial sales tax). On using state taxing authorities to collect a
federal sales tax, see John A. Miller, State Administration of a National Sales Tax: A New
Opportunity for Cooperative Federalism, 9 VA. TAX REV. 243 (1989) (arguing for the
administrative benefits of states collecting a national sales tax).
376. H.R. 2525, 106th Cong. (1999).
377. Fair Tax Act of 2015, S. 155, 114th Cong. (2015); FairTax Act of 2015, H.R. 25,
114th Cong. (2015).
378. Ryan Lovelace, The FairTax Makes a Comeback, NAT’L REV. (Jan. 22, 2015, 4:00
A.M.), http://www.nationalreview.com/article/412527/fairtax-makes-comeback-ryan-lovelace
[https://perma.cc/PJ7F-UFBK].
379. See, e.g., Bruce Bartlett, Why the FairTax Won’t Work, 117 TAX NOTES 1241 (2007);
William G. Gale, Don’t Buy the Sales Tax, BROOKINGS INST. (Mar. 1, 1998), https://www.
brookings.edu/research/dont-buy-the-sales-tax [https://perma.cc/R6NC-R64Q]; Tim Worstall,
Why the Fair Tax Will Fail, FORBES (Aug. 22, 2012, 11:24 A.M.), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/timworstall/2012/08/22/why-the-fair-tax-will-fail/#64b3d80964d0 [https://perma.cc
/ZW55-7PKW].
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administratively superior. Consider the following example. 380 Compare a retail sales
tax of 10% and a VAT of 10% applied to a gallon of milk with a retail price of $1.
Under the retail sales tax, when the grocer sells a gallon, it collects ten cents, which
it then remits to the government. If the grocer fails to collect the ten cents, or collects
it but fails to remit it, the tax is lost. Under a VAT, the same ten cents will be
collected, but incrementally. When the farmer sells a gallon of raw milk to the dairy
for fifty cents, the famer collects five cents from the dairy and remits it. When the
dairy sells the bottled gallon to the grocer for eighty cents, it would collect eight cents
of tax but only pay three cents to the government. It would only pay three cents
because it sold the milk for thirty cents more than it paid, so the 10% tax is only three
cents. On the government’s tax books, the dairy would be credited the five cents it
paid to the farmer. When the grocer sells the gallon to the retail purchaser for one
dollar, it would collect ten cents from the purchaser. It would only pay two cents to
the government, as the government would have credited it for the eight cents it paid
to the dairy. The two cents is ten percent of the value added by the grocer. In the end,
the retail purchaser pays ten cents tax, but the government collects five cents from
the farmer, three cents from the dairy, and two cents from the grocer. The total ten
cents was never at risk. The dairy has an interest in ensuring the farmer paid five
cents, so that the dairy would get its credit, and the grocer had an interest in ensuring
that the dairy had paid its three cents, so that the grocer would get its credit.
The VAT works so well that the United States is the only member of the
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) not to use it. 381
Indeed, membership in the EU requires the use of the VAT.382 The VAT (in one
variation or another) has a history of academic advocates. 383 Its effectiveness has

380. This example illustrates an invoice-credit method VAT, which is but one of several
types but is the most commonly used. See OLIVER, supra note 300, at 383 (discussing this
example and some of the more complicating details).
381. Kyle Pomerleau, Sources of Government Revenue Across the OECD, 2015, TAX
FOUND. (Apr. 30, 2015), http://taxfoundation.org/article/sources-government-revenue-acrossoecd-2015 [https://perma.cc/U32U-5NDK]. The OECD is an intergovernmental organization
comprising many of the world’s developed economies. It focuses on improving the economic
and social well-being of people around the world. About the OECD, ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., https://www.oecd.org/about [https://perma.cc/NB24-CMEN].
382. See BERT LAMAN, EUROPEAN VALUE ADDED TAX (VAT), PRAXITY 7 (2013),
http://www.bkd.com/docs/solution-sheets/european-value-added-tax.pdf
[https://perma.cc
/F7YS-UYHR].
383. See, e.g., Michael J. Graetz, The U.S. Income Tax: Should It Survive the Millennium?,
85 TAX NOTES 1197 (1999) [hereinafter Graetz, U.S. Income Tax]; Graetz, supra note 326, at
289–90; Michael J. Graetz, Taxes That Work: A Simple American Plan, 58 FLA. L. REV. 1043
(2006) [hereinafter Graetz, Taxes that Work] (arguing for a dual system of a VAT and an elite
income tax to simplify tax administration); Alan Schenk, Radical Tax Reform for the 21st
Century: The Role for a Consumption Tax, 2 CHAP. L, REV. 133 (1999) (detailing the history
of post-war tax administration and arguing that the United States’ rejection of a consumption
tax makes it an outlier in other advanced economies); Alan Schenk, Value Added Tax: Does
This Consumption Tax Have a Place in the Federal Tax System?, 7 VA. TAX REV. 207 (1987)
(arguing that the imposition of a VAT fails to account for equity, would have few economic
benefits, and may be administratively burdensome).
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made it popular among political liberals, especially when combined with the income
tax, as Professor Michael Graetz has suggested.384 It also is popular among political
conservatives, who, however, propose it not as an addition to the income tax but as
a replacement for it.385 A bill to implement a federal VAT was first introduced in
1979.386 The Treasury Department has issued a formal report on the use of the
VAT.387 And, the American Bar Association Section on Taxation has drafted a model
VAT statute.388 Nonetheless, the VAT remains on the sidelines, awaiting a political
game change.
While the debate over the VAT has been fairly well rehearsed at this point, perhaps it would be enlivened by adding cybersecurity calls to the voices. In terms of
improving information security, the benefit of a VAT would be like those of a national sales tax. There would not be hundreds of millions of refunds to individuals.
The relevant information is no more than the amount of the sale and the information
relevant to claiming the credit on the resale. The number of taxpayers covered would
be substantially fewer than under the income tax but more than under a sales tax.
Under the sales tax, only retailers would be burdened with collecting and paying tax,
while under a VAT, all those involved in the production of the items sold by the
retailer also would be involved. Of course, these would be business taxpayers rather
than individuals as such.

384. See, e.g., Lori Montgomery, Once Considered Unthinkable, U.S. Sales Tax Gets Fresh
Look, WASH. POST (May 27, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article
/2009/05/26/AR2009052602909.html [https://perma.cc/G7PV-R8U2] (quoting Democratic
Senator Kent Conrad saying, “a VAT and a high-end income tax have got to be on the table”);
Editorial, Mrs. Pelosi’s VAT, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 8, 2009, 12:01 A.M.), https://www.wsj.com
/articles/SB10001424052748703298004574457512007010416 [https://perma.cc/BW9F-XV6P]
(quoting Democratic House Speaker Nancy Pelosi as saying, “somewhere along the way, a valueadded tax plays into this”). For a description of other liberal politicians supporting a VAT, see
OLIVER, supra note 300, at 381. For Professor Graetz’s proposal to combine an elite income tax
and a VAT, see Graetz, supra note 326, at 290; Graetz, Taxes that Work, supra note 383, at 1051.
385. See, e.g., Charles Krauthammer, Opinion, Obamacare’s Next Trick: The VAT, WASH.
POST (Mar. 26, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/25
/AR2010032502406.html [https://perma.cc/E8K9-P858] (conservative political commentator
writes, as “a substitute for the income tax, the VAT would be a splendid idea” but not as a supplement for it); George F. Will, The Perils of the Value-Added Tax, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2010),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/04/16/AR2010041603993.html
[https://perma.cc/A4BQ-PSZM] (conservative political commentator writes that a VAT could
be used to restore fiscal discipline, but if combined with the income tax, would become a
“gargantuan” tax instrument). For a description of other political conservatives supporting a
VAT and similar proposals, see OLIVER, supra note 300, at 382.
386. Tax Restructuring Act of 1979, H.R. 5665, 96th Cong. (1979) (proposed by Oregon
Congressman Ullman, the Chair of the Ways and Means Committee).
387. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH (vol. 3 1984).
388. AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF TAXATION, VALUE ADDED TAX: A MODEL STATUTE
AND COMMENTARY (1989).
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7. Comparison of Proposals
The degree to which any of the proposals succeeded at reducing refunds, requiring
less information, or reducing the number of individuals covered by the system would
depend on the final details. The chart below, however, summarizes a comparison of
proposals on these three points, presuming that the proposals were each adopted
alone. That is fairly unlikely in some instances, and it would be the combination of
proposals that would achieve the best combination of strengths. For example, a
PAYE could not be implemented without substantially simplifying or purifying the
income tax as the current income tax system is just too complicated and pursues too
many goals for PAYE to work. While an elite income tax would not logically require
other changes, its revenue levels would be too low to be implemented without a complementary tax, such as a sales tax or VAT. Similarly, neither a sales tax nor a VAT
likely would generate sufficient revenue to be enacted independently and would need
to be complemented by an income tax. Putting aside each proposal’s revenue potential, equity, efficiency, administrative burdens, and political viability, the following
figure highlights each proposal’s likely impact on improving information security at
the IRS.
Fewer Refunds
PAYE

Less Information

X

Simplified
Income Tax
Purified
Income Tax

X

X

X

Elite Income
Tax
Sales Tax
VAT
Table 1

Fewer Individuals

X

X
X

X

X

X

X

X

CONCLUSION
This Article is realistic about information technology. This technology allows us
to do more than we can do safely. Perhaps someday it will enable us to do safely all
that we want it to do. Probably that day would come sooner if we were more realistic,
more modest about what it is we really need it to do. Unfortunately, today, too much
information held by the government is vulnerable to being stolen, manipulated, or
deleted by criminals, terrorists, or hostile governments.
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This Article proposes a way forward for the information technology security of
the treasure trove of federal tax information held by the government. There is much
more flexibility for deciding how much and what type of tax information is truly
needed than there is flexibility to decide how secure the technology will be. Our
imagination as to how the technology can be used will never weaken our pushes to
do more with it. But our recognition of the real security limits of the technology
should push us to being more selective and cautious as to what we try do with the
technology.
This Article argues that Congress has ample flexibility to devise a tax system that
raises the revenue needed in a fair and efficient way but does so while demanding
less information be collected, stored, and processed by the IRS. These types of reforms will do more to improve the cybersecurity of the IRS system than the IRS
would ever be able to do through its own technology resources. Congress, rather than
the IRS, is the institution most capable of and most responsible for solving the problem. Cybersecurity for tax information should be considered more as a tax code problem than a computer code problem.
This Article commends a particular approach to legislation in this dawning digital
age. In the coming decades, more and more attention will need to be given to the
relationship between legislation and digital technology. Congress needs to assess
how federal agencies will need—or want, or try—to use newer and newer technology
to administer the legislation Congress negotiates. Laws that were drafted when practical barriers meant very little of the relevant information would ever be collected,
except perhaps in the most important or litigated situations, seem quite different
when technology will allow almost all of the relevant information almost always to
be collected. Congress ought to consider carefully the relationship between its legislation and federal agencies’ technological aspirations, carefully considering what it
is they are effectively tasking the agencies to do with their technology and, even more
carefully, considering what the consequences of using that technology for those purposes likely will be. That the information technology used by government agencies
is being tasked to do more than it can do safely is not the fault of agency employees,
but rather it is the fault of those who cobble together the legislation for the agencies
to administer.

